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CONFRONTING THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE
IN CORPORATE FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE
Diane Lourdes Dick'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' corporate sector is in the midst of an exceptionally
turbulent time.' In particular, the field of corporate finance 2 has been the subject of
vigorous public interest, critical documentaries and forceful editorials in the wake
of the recent financial crisis. Consider the myriad headline news stories throughout
the crisis and ensuing recession, detailing commercial loan defaults and workouts, 3

C 2011 Diane Lourdes Dick, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School
of Law. LL.M in Taxation, 2011; J.D., 2005, University of Florida Levin College of Law;
M.A. in Political Science, 1999, Florida International University. I owe a debt of gratitude
to Christine Allie, Scott Bauries, Steve Bender, Arie Beresteanu, Yariv Brauner, Kara
Bruce, Sid DeLong, Michael Friel, Italo Lenta, Jonathan Levy and Andrew Lund for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to the participants of the 2011
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting financial reform panel and the 2011
Midwest Corporate Law Scholars Conference for their helpful insights. Finally, I especially
thank Danaya Wright for her encouragement, and Mathew Autio for his love and support.
' See, e.g., Jonathan Cheng, Stocks Tumble on US Growth Fears, European Banks;
DJIA Off 435, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO20110818-712771.html (summarizing recent economic concerns in the commercial,
industrial and financial sectors); Eric Morath, Business Bankruptcies Fell 18% in May but
Trend Might Not Hold, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl0001424052702304259304576377881790360422.html
(noting that
in 2008
commercial bankruptcies nearly doubled in the wake of the recent financial crisis and
recession).
2 In transactional practice, the term "corporate finance" encompasses a range of valuemaximizing and capital-raising activities. Corporate financing-loosely defined as the
capital that funds the formation, operation and expansion of business enterprise-may be
comprised of equity or debt, with the latter typically derived from traditional bank loans,
syndicated lending arrangements and publicly and privately placed debt securities. See,
e.g., JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 4-7 (1997).

3 E.g., Ethan Smith & Dana Cimilluca, Terra Firma Weighs Seeking $160 Million to
Avoid Loan Default, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703575004575044012751707020.html;
Jonathan Stempel, Pizza
Chain Sbarro Sees Default, Explores Options, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/06/sbarro-idUSNO615165620110106;
Anton
Troianovski & Jenny Strasburg, For Farallon,a $1.5 Billion Workout, WALL ST. J. (June
29, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033741045753373129077
00330.html.
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high profile corporate bankruptcies, 4 devastating bank failures,5 and startling fire
sales of entrenched Wall Street firms.6 Debt financing in particular has attracted
considerable attention, as many analysts consider securitized debt obligations and
unregulated derivative trading to be a cause of the crisis.
Even setting aside technical explanations about the relationship between any
given corporate financial practice and broader market disruptions, the financial
crisis has made it abundantly clear that where private financing arrangements
overlap to create a sufficiently large and complex web of interconnected
transactions, the consequences of default can be quite public. For instance, during
one of the most dramatic weeks of the recession, President Obama made forceful
remarks underscoring the relationship between corporate financing decisions and
the fate of established and iconic companies. 8 When Chrysler's corporate lenders
failed to unanimously consent on a proposed settlement, the company was forced
to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.9 Of the lenders refusing consent,
President Obama remarked: "They were hoping that everybody else would make
sacrifices, and they would have to make none ... I don't stand with them." 0

4 Andrew

Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold, N.Y.

TIMES

(Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/I51ehman.html.
5 Robin Sidel, David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P.
Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J. Sept. 26, 2008, at Al,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html.
6 E.g., James Saft, Bear Stearns's Fall Prompts a Search for Faith in Banking and

Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/18/business
/worldbusiness/18iht-rtrcoll9.1.11209658.html; Hugh Son, AIG FallsAfter Failing to Give
Plan to Save Rating (Update4), BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agiwl4SqiTgY; see also Chris Isidore, General
Motors Bankruptcy: End of an Era, CNNMONEY.COM (June 2, 2009), http://money.cnn.
Motors'
(reporting on General
com/2009/06/01/news/companies/gm bankruptcy
bankruptcy, including their removal from the Dow Jones industrial average which has

included General Motors since 1925). For a lively account of events leading up to the
crisis, see

ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES

(2010).

On the causes of the financial crisis, see, for example,

BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
HISTORY
THE
HIDDEN
HERE:
ARE
DEVILS
ALL
THE
NOCERA,
7

(2011), and William Poole, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 20072009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421 (2010). For a brief summary of the suspected role

of securitization and derivatives, see Shannon D. Harrington & Abigail Moses, Credit
Swap Disclosure Obscures True Financial Risk (Update3),

BLOOMBERG.COM

(Nov. 6,

2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJzpwmliC4M.
8 Amanda Ruggeri, Obama Points to New Villain in Chrysler Bankruptcy: Hedge
Funds, U.S. NEWS (May 1, 2009), http://www.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/

05/01/obama-points-to-new-villain-in-chrysler-bankruptcy-hedge-funds.
9 Id.
10 Id.
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As with most turbulent economic eras, this period of strife will leave many
enduring legacies. In particular, some market participants and observers are
demanding greater involvement by governmental 'institutions in financial
markets." Legal reform is underway 2 and is likely to continue as new insights
emerge from ongoing empirical research as to the role of law, institutions and
public policy in financial markets. 3 Careful attention from the legal academy is
needed to facilitate the emerging public debate. At best, the verdict is still out on
the efficacy of the prevailing legal paradigm in corporate finance.
For the most part, reform efforts have been focused on increasing oversight of
the financial services industry, either by imposing new laws and regulations upon
specific types of financial institutions,14 or by recharacterizing certain transactions
so that existing statutory and regulatory frameworks cover them.' 5 In the latter

1 Calls for increased governmental oversight were a significant motivation for the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 12 & 15 U.S.C.),
which was signed into law on July 21, 2010. See Damian Paletta, U.S. Lawmakers Reach
Accord on New FinanceRules, WALL ST. J. (June 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703615104575328020013164184.html (noting the influence of public
opinion and advocacy groups on the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act).
12 See Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory
Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 463-83 (providing a thorough discussion of recent
financial regulatory reform efforts).
13 A recent issue of the Brigham Young University Law Review explored a number of
these questions. Symposium, Evaluating Legal Origins Theory, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1413
(including several articles on the topic of law and finance).
14 For instance, under existing laws, the Federal Reserve Board regulates financial
holding companies. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852
(2006). Depending upon the institution's charter, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve and state
agencies may regulate commercial banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§
1811-1835a (2006) (providing statutory authority for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's regulatory oversight of banking institutions); id § 1842 (providing
regulatory authority for the Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. §§ 1-197.21 (or 1.1-1.8) (2010)
(providing the rules and regulations of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency);
Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J.
ON REG. 143, 149 (2009) ("If a bank has a state charter and is neither federally insured nor
a member of the Federal Reserve system, its primary regulator for consumer protection will
be the state banking regulator and/or the state attorney general."). More recently, Congress
imposed additional regulations on certain financial institutions. See Bank and Savings
Association Holding Company and Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements Act of
2010, Dodd-Frank Act §§ 601-628.
15See David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New FinancialInstruments Under the Federal
Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599 (1986) (providing a historical
context for understanding the regulation of commodities and securities by the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission); see also
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. G7 Advisory Servs., LLC, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1289,
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case, such recharacterizations effectively elevate particular instruments from a
baseline status as private contracts16 into a more specialized category of
instruments subject to regulation under securities or commodities laws.
Yet long before a financial crisis unfolds, and long before Congress has the
occasion to revamp statutory frameworks, even the most innovative financing
arrangements are within the law's reach. For instance, they remain subject to a
range of broadly applicable legal principles, such as those governing contracts
generally.' 7 Further, where parties seek legal redress, financing arrangements are
subject to the jurisdiction of courts.' 8 Thus, as these broader debates turn, one
question must loom particularly large among legal scholars: What role do courts
play in the formation and execution of financial law and policy? Moreover, what
role should courts play? As history has revealed with respect to other areas of the
law,19 judicial decisions can have profound effects, both in terms of resolving
disputes or granting relief and, more broadly, by stimulating legislation that alters
the direction of reform efforts. Moreover, the availability of an effective judicial
process can serve as an important foundation for commercial and financial
activity.2 0
1292-95 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (providing an overview of the history of expanded regulatory
reach, particularly in the context of commodities trading).
16 Recent attention has focused on "derivatives," which is a category of financial
instruments that includes a variety of privately negotiated contracts, such as interest rate
swaps, credit default swaps, equity swaps and commodity price swaps. These transactions
are designed to manage risk and enhance profits. Although the financial engineering behind
these products can be complex, the transaction is carried out by a contract, often executed
using a relatively brief, standardized form. See, e.g., Fin. One Pub. Co. v. Lehman Bros.
Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 338-40 (2d Cir. 2005) (analyzing claims arising under
derivatives contracts using state contract law without reference to laws governing
specialized financial instruments); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Controladora
Comercial Mexicana S.A.B. De C.V., No. 603215/08, 2010 WL 4868142, at *6-7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2010) (same).
1 See supra note
16.
18 Financing arrangements are contracts, and as such are subject to the jurisdiction of
courts; extensive rules of civil procedure determine which court(s) have jurisdiction. See

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-78 (1985) (describing in detail the
minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction in a suit involving contract claims).
19 See, e.g., MATTHEW H. BOSWORTH, COURTS AS CATALYSTS: STATE SUPREME
COURTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE EQUITY 5-6 (2001) (discussing the role of courts in
education finance reform).
20 The interdisciplinary subfield "law and finance" has brought questions of this sort
to the forefront. These studies claim positive correlations between common law legal
systems and strong financial markets, presumably because courts are better able to provide
flexible and responsive redress for investor claims. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio

Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113, 1115-17 (1998) (advancing the hypothesis that financial markets tend to

flourish in common law countries partly because such systems provide enhanced protection
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Nevertheless, even the most cursory review reveals minimal lawmaking by
22
21
courts in the area of corporate finance. 2 1 With limited exception, courts presiding
over cases in this realm tend to circumvent more expansive interpretive analyses
when identifying substantive rights and obligations or procedural remedies.. Some
courts even decline to extend common law doctrines that broadly overlie all
contracts.23 At first blush, this tendency appears to reflect the textualist interpretive
paradigm dominating American jurisprudence in recent years.2 4 However, as this

of minority shareholders); Magda Bianco, Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Courts and
Banks: Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets 1-16 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy
Research, Discussion Paper No. 3347, 2002), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs
/dps/DP3347.asp (finding a positive correlation between judicial efficiency and healthy
credit markets in Italian provinces).
21 Judicial lawmaking, or "judge-made law," finds its roots in THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) and the landmark case,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically, the province
and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."). However, the notion of
judge-made law has long been controversial, and even the highest court has questioned its
constitutional foundation. E.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 678 (1898)

("Our duty is to execute the law, not to make it."); see also

CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE
RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE
LAW (1994) (providing a thorough history ofjudicial review in the U.S. Supreme Court).

See infra Part III for a discussion of expansive analyses in securities law.
23 Most jurisdictions recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
contracts. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369 (1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (articulating the general legal principle). However, the expansion
of implied covenants in the realm of corporate finance has been effectively curtailed,
because most courts decline to recognize a fiduciary duty of a lender to a borrower. ADT
Operations, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 662 N.Y.S.2d 190, 192-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1997) ("[T]he legal relationship between a customer and a bank is an arm's length, debtorcreditor relationship which does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship . . . .");
see also Bennice v. Lakeshore Says. & Loan Ass'n., 677 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1998) ("Absent the existence of a special relationship of trust and confidence, a bank
has no duty to inform a customer or depositor of the tax consequences of a transaction
22

24 Textualism is an interpretive approach which courts use to apply objective
methodology, such as construing language in accordance with plain meaning. Justice Scalia
and Judge Easterbrook have described and defended this approach to statutory
interpretation. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 18-25 (1998) (describing textualist statutory interpretation); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 547 (1983) (recognizing that
attempting to derive legislative intent when interpreting a statute, is difficult because
legislative bodies lack any discemable collective intent). Textualism has become infused in
contract interpretation methodology, fueled by a reemergence of formalism in modem
contract law. E.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good
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Article will demonstrate, finance and lending jurisprudence has forged a unique
path, and many areas of corporate finance have persistently eluded the rigorous
27 law have
judicial analyses that corporate, 25 transactional, 2 6 and bankruptcy
endured. It seems, then, that there are deeper historical and philosophical forces at
work.
Indeed, the prevailing judicial decision-making approach in corporate finance
finds its roots in what this Article calls the "Certainty Imperative," which is a
decisional paradigm that infuses the goal of stability in financial markets into the
deeply entrenched normative theme of legal certainty.28 Specifically, the
Imperative asserts that stable financial markets are achieved in an environment of
"legal certainty," which, in the realm of finance and lending, is best preserved
when courts exercise considerable restraint, narrowly tailoring opinions to strict
construction and passive enforcement of contracts. Imperative-driven rulings are
rooted in the belief that financial markets are vital to the national interest, and
therefore judges ought to decide cases in this realm in a manner that advances
broad economic efficiency goals. As it has evolved across decades of case law and
legislative enactments, the Imperative has profoundly altered judicial decisionmaking in finance and lending.
Yet despite the Imperative's considerable impact, it is not a positive legal
doctrine; rather, it is simply the reason for the relatively empty space where
Faith,40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1223, 1223-30 (1999) (studying the effects of formalism
upon the contractual duty of good faith).
25 See infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text (describing judicial lawmaking by

Delaware courts in the area of corporate law).
26

Contracts relating to business transactions (other than financing arrangements)

often include Delaware choice-of-law and/or forum selection clauses. Additionally, most
major firms are incorporated under Delaware law. The Delaware Court of Chancery has
been active in developing common law doctrine in the areas of corporate and transactional
law, particularly with respect to fiduciary duties and the roles of managers and
shareholders. E.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 39-40
(1993); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1817 (2006) ("One of the noteworthy features of

Delaware law is its heavy reliance on judge-made standards to regulate corporate affairs.");
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89

GEO.

L.J. 439, 459 (2001) (noting, primarily in reference to Delaware corporate jurisprudence,
judge-made standards with respect to the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care); Robert A.
Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,77 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1099, 1100-02 (1999) (detailing the evolution of judicially-crafted standards of
shareholder responsibilities).
27 See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 85 (2006) ("As a normative

matter, judicial lawmaking in bankruptcy should be called and analyzed in terms of federal
common law, not equity. Federal common lawmaking is already happening, but no one
recognizes it as such.").
28

See infra Part II.A.
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corporate finance jurisprudence ought to be. In spite of the Imperative's lack of
academic treatment, the paradigm's implications are of plain consequence. The
Imperative's methodological constraints have become a paralyzing force upon the
judiciary, preventing the courts from participating in financial law reform. In
essence, the state of finance and lending jurisprudence can be summarized thusly:
deference, in the very broadest sense, is shown to the legal status quo.
This Article argues that the methodological constraints of the Imperative have
abandoned its underlying goals of certainty and stability in financial markets.
Therefore, a new paradigm is needed that will enable courts to allocate rights and
remedies in accordance with the economic substance of arrangements, and thus
better enhance market stability. This Article proceeds as follows: Part II articulates
the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Imperative. Part III examines the
economic theory and assumptions reflected in Imperative-driven decisions, as well
as the interpretive methodology that has evolved across a range of judicial
decisions and legislative enactments. Part IV introduces a recent case that
exemplifies the current state of corporate finance jurisprudence under Imperativedriven methodologies, and provides a brief overview of the methods by which
courts typically construe financing agreements under strict interpretive norms. Part
V proffers an alternative decisional paradigm that is designed both to enable courts
to engage in a more expansive analysis and also to empower courts to allocate
legal rights and remedies in a manner that is consistent with the actual economic
arrangement of the parties. Part VI concludes with a recommendation that this
more expansive approach may be more apt to enhance stability in financial
markets.
II. THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE

The scarcity of doctrinal law with respect to rights and obligations of parties
to financing transactions reflects, to some extent, the limited involvement of courts
in this area. As a general matter, most of the judiciary's recent forays into finance
and banking have been limited to questions of federal preemption of state laws 29
For example, a line of cases considers conflict between the federal Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-bbbb (2006), which supplements the
Securities Act of 1933, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (2006), and various state securities
laws. See, e.g., Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 85 F.3d 970, 974 (2d Cir.
1996) ("The Trust Indenture Act was enacted because previous abuses by indenture
trustees had adversely affected 'the national public interest and the interest of investors in
notes, bonds [and] debentures,' and Congress sought to address this national problem in a
uniform way . . . ." (citations omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a) (1994))); Zeffiro v.
First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 1980) ("It is hard to believe that
Congress would have established uniform standards to govern indentures and then
paradoxically have allowed the application of those standards to depend on the law of the
state of the suit."). On federal preemption of state law in the area of consumer lending, see
Levitin, supra note 27, at 145-47, 158 (describing federal preemption in the area of
29
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and regulationS30 or controversies over consumer credit and residential mortgage
lending. 3 1 This is not to say that disputes arising under sophisticated corporate
financing transactions do not ultimately find their way into court. In fact, as these
arrangements grow larger and more complex, the claims that arise generate ample
litigation.32 Cases of this sort tend to arrive in federal courts (including bankruptcy
courts) and the state courts of New York.33 However, as I argue in the following
sections, finance and lending jurisprudence, including cases extending into the
related areas of consumer finance and public finance, reveals a number of insights
into the judiciary's limited role in financial matters.
A. PreservingStability in FinancialMarkets

Finance and lending law reform is often reactionary, developed ex post in the
wake of an economic downturn. 3 4 Thus, to find the historical roots of present
jurisprudential norms in corporate finance, we must look considerably beyond the
most recent economic crisis. Commencing in the 1970s and extending into the
1980s, a range of factors converged to create a tremendous amount of turbulence in
the global economy. Upon the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early
banking regulation but suggesting that a state's ability to regulate secondary consumer debt
markets has not yet been preempted).
30 The Supreme Court has grappled with the role of states in regulating the activities
of federally chartered banks. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 6-7
(2007) (holding that the National Bank Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., preempts
state licensing, registration and inspection requirements as applied to national banks and
their operating subsidiaries).
1 See generally Jo Carrillo, DangerousLoans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable

Rate Mortgages, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 3 (2008) (discussing litigation-based reform
efforts in the context of the mortgage market).
32 See, e.g., Chad Abraham, Gorsuch's Legal Fight with Bank Moves to Federal
Court, Arbitration a Possibility, ASPEN DAILY NEws (Aug. 15, 2011),
(describing heated litigation
http://www.aspendailynews.com/section/home/148554

between a commercial bank and a corporate borrower's subsidiaries regarding actions
taken by the bank with respect to a credit agreement); Steve Green, Fontainebleau Las
Vegas Developers Fight 'Vulture Investors' Lawsuit, VEGASINC.COM (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/20 1/sep/06/fontainebleau-las-vegas-developers-fight-

vulture-i (describing extensive litigation stemming from a $2.84 billion credit facility).
3 The State of New York is overwhelmingly selected in choice-of-law provisions of
sophisticated credit agreements, likely due to New York City's prominence as a global
financial center. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies' Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1475, 1478 (2009) (studying a data set of
2,882 agreements filed in 2002).
34 Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the InternationalFinancialArchitecture After the
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 81, 82 (2009) ("[F]inancial law-whether
domestic or international-has always developed as a child of crises.").
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1970s, major currency exchange rates were permitted to float; initially, this
brought extraordinary volatility to capital markets.35 United States banking and
financial sectors were particularly vulnerable to the instability, and faced
additional capitalization risks resulting from newly variable exchange rates.
Commodity prices fluctuated wildly37 and interest rates ricocheted as inflationary
pressures mounted.3 8 Aggressive anti-inflationary actions taken by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board") further exacerbated
market volatility. 39 Bank failures began to increase in the 1970s, and surged in the
1980s. 40 Indeed, by any measure, the period from the early 1970s until the mid1980s was a particularly turbulent time in United States economic history.
Against this backdrop of instability, and largely in response to Keynesian 41
interventionist measures taken by the Board in the New Deal era as well as at the
peak of the inflationary crisis of the 1970S,42 a school of neoclassical economics

35 JACQUELINE BEST, THE LIMITS OF TRANSPARENCY: AMBIGUITY AND THE HISTORY
OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE
128-29 (2005); GEORGE ALEXANDER WALKER,
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 25 (2001) ("[T]he

net effect of freely floating currencies was to create huge new levels of currency and
interest rate instability in global markets.").
36 WALKER, supra note 35; see also Joseph Gold, Public InternationalLaw in the
International Monetary System, 38 Sw. L.J. 799, 799-802 (1984) (exploring emerging
theories of an international monetary system, partly informed by a climate of volatile
exchange rates at the time of publication).
3 BARRY P. BOSWORTH & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, COMMODITY PRICES AND THE NEW

35-37 (1982); see also Jerry W. Markham, FederalRegulation ofMargin in the
Commodity Futures Industry-History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 59, 76-99 (1991)
(describing historical trends in legislative and regulatory approaches to the management of
commodity futures pricing).
38 Menachem Katz, Inflation, Taxation, and the Rate of Interest in Eight Industrial
Countries, 1961-82, in TAXATION, INFLATION, AND INTEREST RATES 182-84 (Vito Tanzi
ed., 1984).
3 See DONALD R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: A HISTORY 127 (2004)
(describing tension between enacting anti-inflationary policies and combating
unemployment); Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act: A
CriticalReappraisal,38 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1077-79 (1986) (describing anti-inflationary
INFLATION

measures taken by the Board).
40 FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS,

THE NEW FINANCE: REGULATION

AND

FINANCIAL

38 (1996) (graphing the increase in bank failures during these decades).
41 Keynesian economic theory assumes that certain governmental economic and fiscal
policies can stimulate or restrain market expansion; these interventions are necessary
because, although free markets are believed to be self-balancing, the point of equilibrium
features socially undesirable characteristics. For instance, unemployment may remain high.
STABILITY

See generally JOHN MAYNARD
INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).
42

KEYNES, THE GENERAL

THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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became preeminent. With roots at the University of Chicago,43 these "Chicago
School" economists rejected the notion of governmental regulation in most
financial affairs, arguing that markets are perfectly competitive, inherently stable,
and entirely efficient so long as they are permitted to function without excessive
governmental interference.4 4
Such history is an essential predicate to understanding the judiciary's modem
approach to finance and lending cases. Indeed, as Professor Gilmore predicted in
his 1977 seminal work on American jurisprudence,45 starting in the late 1970s
courts began to move away from the "interventionist, egalitarian contract
jurisprudence of the 1960s and 7 0 s,,46 in favor of a market-based approach that
underscored freedom of contract.47 Cases involving corporate finance agreements
particularly reflect these evolving sentiments. In 1979, the Third Circuit declined
to recognize a common law fiduciary duty of a bank to its borrower, explaining
that the "legislature is best suited to consider the delicate financial issues at stake
and strike the appropriate balance between sound economics on the one hand, and
expectations of loyalty on the other."48 Implicit in the court's reasoning is the
43 The most noted of the Chicago School economists was University of Chicago
economics professor Milton Friedman, who received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1976.
See Milton Friedman, Inflation and Unemployment, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec.

13, 1976).
4 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980)
(setting forth the essential tenets of libertarian economic policies); Daniel A. Farber, The
Law and Economics Movement, in 4 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY

21, 21-27 (Joann L. Miller & Michael Lewis eds., 1987) (providing an overview of the
Chicago School's fundamental principles); Pietro S. Nivola, The New Protectionism: U.S.

Trade Policy in HistoricalPerspective, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 577 (1986) (contrasting libertarian
economic policies with protectionist trade policies, and arguing that the latter lead to
deterioration in trade); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (a
classic work of political philosophy describing the "minimal state," in which the state
restricts its activities to narrow functions including, inter alia, protection against threats of
force, theft and fraud, and enforcement of voluntary agreements).
45 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 107-11 (1977) (hinting at an
"Easter-tide" of reemerging formalism in American contract law).
46 Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV.
1131, 1133 (1995) (summarizing Professor Gilmore's predictions).
47 See Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the
New Formalism (with ParticularReference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 13, 16 n.8 (2001) (discussing Professor Gilmore's thesis and critical reactions
thereto). Professor Gilmore's observations are similarly relevant in areas beyond contract
law. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT
AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011) (describing the interconnections between
neoclassical economic theory and penal laws).
48 Wash. Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[E]ven if ...
sound public policy, it would hardly be the province of this court to say so .

. .

. First,

establishing a per se common law fiduciary duty of banks to their borrowers seems
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belief that lending relationships require more delicate legal handling than other
economic relationships in the commercial marketplace. These concerns about
vulnerability in the banking sector reflect the historical context as well as the
libertarian economic theories gaining renewed interest in the 1970s.
The notion that courts are ill-equipped to tamper with the lending relationship
gained far greater prominence in a 1980 Supreme Court consumer finance decision
concerning questions arising under one of the most influential pieces of modern
banking legislation, the Truth in Lending Act (the "Act").49 In Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milhollin,50 the Court considered whether a creditor must disclose to a
borrower its right to accelerate the maturity date of debt obligations. Noting that
"caution must temper judicial creativity" when interpreting legislation, 5 the Court
turned to strict interpretive norms to construe the plain meaning of the Act.52 The
Court held that the question had been addressed in regulations promulgated under
the Act and in guidance issued by Board staff.53 Given that Congress expressly
delegated administrative authority to the Board, the Court found that such
explanatory material, unless "demonstrably irrational," is dispositive.5 4
Consequently, disclosure was not required under the Act.
In terms of its holding, Milhollin is not a landmark decision; rather, it is one
of many cases that broadly fall within the so-called deference rule,55 whereby
archetypically within the domain of legislative judgment."), overruled on other grounds by
Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 n.4 (3d Cir. 1992).

Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1667f (2006)). The Act applies only to consumer credit (i.e., credit issued for family
49

or household purposes as opposed to business, commercial, industrial or agricultural
purposes). §1603. To the extent a transaction is subject to the Act, the law mandates certain
disclosures by the creditor with respect to the extension of credit. See Elwin Griffith,
Lenders and Consumers Continue the Searchfor the Truth in Lending Under the Truth in
Lending Act and RegulationZ, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 611, 612 (2007).
5o
51

444 U.S. 555 (1980).

Id. at 565.
Id. at 562-64. Specifically, the Court found that an acceleration clause was not a
"default, delinquency, or similar charg[e]," and thus not subject to mandatory disclosure
under the express statutory language. Id. at 562.
5 Id. at 564 n.8.
54
Id. at 565.
5 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) ("[T]he ultimate
criterion [in construction of administrative regulations] is the administrative interprelation,
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation."). A seminal deference rule case is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See also, e.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007)
(deferring to valid and binding Department of Labor regulations construing the Fair Labor
Standards Act); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997) (deferring to reasonable
interpretation by Secretary of Labor of regulations promulgated by the Department of
52

Labor under the Fair Labor Standards Act); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S.
680, 696 (1991) ("Judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions
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courts defer to congressionally sanctioned agency interpretations of federal statutes
or regulations. 56 Deference is granted notwithstanding the judiciary's constitutional
power to construe existing law or "fill[] the interstitial silences withip a statute or a
regulation."57 Thus, Milhollin references fairly typical deference rule justifications
for judicial restraint: "Congress, in delegating regulatory authority to the Board,
by 'uniform
has chosen to resolve interpretive issues under [the Act]
58
administrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation."'
Yet for those interested in finance and lending, Milhollin has philosophical
implications that extend far beyond its contributions to deference rule
jurisprudence or even consumer finance law in general. Rendered at the peak of the
1980-82 recession, the decision echoes the Third Circuit5 9 by reflecting an
enormous amount of apprehension as to the role of courts in the realm of finance
and lending. In fact, Milhollin ventures substantially farther than the Third Circuit,
infusing the goal of stability in financial markets into the more entrenched
normative value of legal certainty, which is a long-standing theme that has
persisted across centuries of common law. 6 0 Articulating a heightened need for
of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the
political and judicial branches.").
56

If the intent of Congress is clear ... the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction

of the statute.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
57 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).

Hess v. Citibank, 459 F.3d 837, 843 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Milhollin, 444 U.S. at
567-68).
59 Wash. Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1979), discussed supra
58

note 48 and accompanying text.
60

"He who destroys the means of certainty does a greater mischief than the sower of

dragon's teeth."

BYRON

K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F.

ELLIOTT, THE WORK OF THE ADVOCATE

422 (2d ed. 1911). Legal certainty, as a broader normative goal, is to a large extent
synonymous with the phrase "rule of law." In the transactional and commercial realm,
certainty is often associated with uniformity, as precision in the law is believed to allow
parties to more efficiently structure transactions and order commercial expectations. A core
value of the earliest lex mercatoria,the goal of legal certainty continues to be articulated in
cases that touch upon finance and tending. See, e.g., Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex
Mercatoria-Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 67, 77 (2004); see also

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) ("The issuance of
commercial paper ... is on a vast scale .... The application of state law ... would subject
the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of
the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain."); Ry. Co. v. Sprague, 103
U.S. 756, 761-62 (1880) ("To hold that the moment an unpaid coupon is left on a bond its
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"sure guidance" by persons engaged in the business of finance and lending, the
Court notes that judicial deference to agency interpretation is especially
appropriate when construing this particular "highly technical" Act.6' In essence,
the decision recognizes a subjective notion of legal certainty, referred to as "sure
guidance," which does not turn upon objective principles of uniformity and clarity
in the law, but rather upon the desire for financial institutions to sense that the law
governing lending transactions has remained unchanged.
More recent cases have reiterated Milhollin 's holding and policy rationale in
the context of judicial deference to agency interpretations of the Act. 62 More
importantly, the infusion of financial market stability into the theme of legal
certainty has continued across a range of cases.63 Thus emerged what this Article
calls the "Certainty Imperative": a judicial paradigm that has taken root in the
finance and lending realm, and that, over time, has profoundly altered judicial
decision-making methodology. The Imperative tends to manifest as a pervasive
rhetoric in judicial opinions, which takes the form of policy arguments, 4 dicta,65 or
as strong cautionary words to lower courts. 6 6 It often serves as justification for
judicial inaction.6 7 Conversely, in the rare case that a court applies a more

character and negotiability are changed would greatly embarrass the traffic in such
securities and lead to endless uncertainty and confusion."). As I argue in this Article, the
goal of legal certainty has come to dominate judicial decision-making in the realm of
finance and lending in recent decades.
61 Milhollin, 444 U.S.
at 565-68.
62 See, e.g., Hess, 459 F.3d at 843 (quoting Milhollin and
explaining, "Creditors need
'sure guidance through the highly technical Truth in Lending Act,' and Congress, in
delegating regulatory authority to the Board, has chosen to resolve interpretive issues under
the TILA by 'uniform administrative decision, rather than piecemeal through litigation."');
Gaydos v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 941 F. Supp. 669, 672-73, 677 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(quoting Milhollin and concluding that "caution must temper judicial creativity in the face
of legislative or regulatory silence").
63 See infra note 64.
64 E.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988) (explaining that the securities market
"demands certainty and predictability"); In re Symons Frozen Foods Inc., 432 B.R. 290,
300 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2010) (resolving a conflict of laws question pertaining to
statutory liens based in part upon the court's belief that "the application of Washington law
... is supported by its effect of... creating certainty in the market.").
65 Judicial dicta, though seemingly iniocuous at first blush, can have profound and
even unintended effects. See generally Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining
Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953 (2005) (providing a thorough analysis of dicta in legal
opinions). Much of the language quoted from cases discussed in this section can be
described as either dicta or as policy rationale. In either case, such language reveals
important
insights into underlying motivations of the court.
66
See infra notes 137-141 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 133-136 and accompanying
text.
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expansive paradigm to resolve a controversy arising over a financing arrangement,
68
the Imperative might appear as assurance that the decision does not go too far.
Generally focused on the needs of banking and financial institutions rather
than borrowers, 69 the Imperative promotes bright-line rules that provide "all
prospective lenders the certainty that is so important to the effective operation of
markets,, 7 0 or that deliver "guiding principlefs] for those whose daily activities
must be limited and instructed" by laws and regulations governing commercial
transactions. 7 1 The theme is often invoked as a rationale for maintaining the legal
72
status quo, as courts lament a seemingly inequitable outcome under current law,
but decline to engage in law reform out of concern that any deviation from the
73
expectations imputed to lenders collectively might disrupt financial markets. To
this end, courts invoke forceful language, expressing fear that a decision might
"throw credit markets into confusion and destabilize this area of law," 74 or "disrupt
orderly credit markets."
For example, in a 1997 case finding successor liability based on an asset purchase
at a foreclosure sale, the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
noted, "[t]he court's holding in this case will not disrupt the credit markets, because the
facts are unique." New York v. Westwood-Squibb Pharm. Co., 981 F. Supp. 768, 791
(W.D.N.Y. 1997).
69 Courts have denounced consideration of the consequential effects resulting from a
ruling adverse to a borrower. E.g., A.I. Credit Corp. v. Jamaica, 666 F. Supp. 629, 633
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[O]ur holding could have a devastating financial impact . . . due to
[cross-default provisions across several financing agreements]. But it is not the function of
a federal district court . .. to evaluate the consequences to the debtor of its inability to pay
68

nor the foreign policy or other repercussions .

. .

. Such considerations are properly the

concern of other governmental institutions.").
70 In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2005) ("[Slome line must be
drawn so that the lenders generally can make rational decisions when underwriting loans
.... [T]he outcome ... is at least one that a lender could have anticipated and adjusted for
accordingly.").
7' Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983) (declining to expand insider trading
liability).
may not accomplish the
72 Bulson, 327 B.R. at 844-45 ("While the definition ...
equitable perfection sought by those courts that champion a case-by-case or totality of the
circumstances approach, the exclusion of a few lenders . . . seems a small price to pay for
the certainty afforded by a more precise definition.").
73 See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
74 Smith v. Anderson, 801 F.2d 661, 665 (4th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he loan transaction here
complied with the careful requirements of state and federal law. To supplement those
requirements with ones of our own devising would throw credit markets into confusion and
destabilize this area of law.").
7 Algemene Bank Nederland v. Hallwood Indus., Inc., 133 B.R. 176, 180-81 (W.D.
Pa. 1991) (explaining that under a loan assumption agreement, the assignor remained liable
to the holder after the holder was unable to recover from the assignee because of
involuntary bankruptcy; to find otherwise "would not only be unwarranted but would also
disrupt orderly credit markets").
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The Fourth Circuit went so far as to suggest a slippery slope of sorts, whereby
a ruling adverse to the expectations of lenders76 might send tremors through the
industry, causing "untold and unknown consequences that cannot now be fully
foreseen," "undefinable instability" and even "widespread confusion."n Other
times, courts express this Imperative in vague terms, as if to imply some universal
understanding that markets are profoundly sensitive to judicial decisions that
modify existing law. For instance, courts have referred to undefined "ripple
effects," 78 and the simply stated policy concern: "credit markets may be
affected."7 9 When we consider such expressive verbiage in its historical context,
the Imperative does not seem to be a reasoned judicial philosophy, but rather a
consequence of a shaken economy and a loose synthesis of emerging academic
theories that seemed to offer new direction for maintaining stability. The following
section explores the additional goal of uniformity that tends to accompany the
Imperative.
B. Promoting Uniformity in Contract Terms

In disputes that turn on contractual agreements, the Imperative frequently
espouses the additional goal of uniformity-a goal heralded as a proxy for legal
certainty. Much like the notion of legal certainty reflected in the Imperative, the
value of uniformity is measured from the subjective standpoint of lenders and
financial institutions analyzed as a homogenous group. For instance, in Broad v.
Rockwell International Corp.,80 the Fifth Circuit sought to construe language in a
bond indenture agreement, including provisions that were common boilerplate in
the debt securities industry.8 ' The court downplayed variations in the terms of any
particular indenture, noting that such provisions are intended to reach uniform
results: "[Boilerplate provisions] have been stated in many different ways in
various indentures. Since there is seldom any difference in the intended meaning,
such provisions are susceptible of standardized expression." 82 Deferring to the
Where the expectation of lenders is reasonable and based on an agency
interpretation in a particularly complex field of law. Cetto v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n,
518 F.3d 263, 277 (4th Cir. 2008).
76

7

Id.

Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994)
(stating that in the federal securities law, "uncertainty and excessive litigation can have
ripple effects").
7 E.g., In re Fracasso, 210 B.R. 221, 228 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (declining to afford
debtors a blanket exemption for the equity in their primary residences, because "[t]here are
serious state policy issues at play; for example, credit markets may be affected by this
revision of the state statute"), rev'd, 222 B.R. 400 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1998), aff'dper curiam,
187 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 1999).
78

80
8

8

642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 943.

2Id. at

942.
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imputed expectations of debt holders, the court explained the need for "uniformity"
in construing provisions, as such "uniformity . . . is what makes it possible

meaningfully to compare one debenture issue with another, focusing only on the
business provisions of the issue

. . .

and the economic conditions of the issuer,

without being misled by peculiarities in the underlying instruments."
Similarly, in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,8 4 the Second

Circuit succinctly summarized the importance of uniformity in construing
boilerplate provisions: "uniformity in interpretation is important to the efficiency
of capital markets."85 Further reiterating the Broad message of deference to the
interpretation assigned by debt holders to boilerplate provisions, the court
eloquently articulated the importance of judicial restraint:
[T]he creation of enduring uncertainties ... would decrease the value of
all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working of capital
markets. Such uncertainties would vastly increase the risks and,
therefore, the costs of borrowing with no offsetting benefits either in the
capital market or in the administration of justice. 86
The court denounced the appellant's "literal approach," choosing instead to adopt
an approach that it believed would advance the principal interests of debt holders
at the expense of what the court believed was of marginal interest to the issuer.87
A number of subsequent decisions in the financing realm construing form
contracts and boilerplate provisions have embraced the notion that courts ought to
defer to prevailing interpretations imputed to lenders collectively.88 One example is
8
84

Id. at 943.

8

Id. at 1048.

86

Id.

691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).

8 Id. at

1049-50. The court explained:

Where contractual language seems designed to protect the interests of both
parties and where conflicting interpretations are argued, the contract should be
construed to sacrifice the principal interests of each party as little as possible. An
interpretation which sacrifices a major interest of one of the parties while
furthering only a marginal interest of the other should be rejected in favor of an
interpretation which sacrifices marginal interests of both parties in order to
protect their major concerns.
Id. at 1051. The case is examined in more detail in Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati,
Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1129, 1156 (2006), and in Dale B. Tauke, Should
Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate Over Corporate Bondholder
Rights, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 90-96 (1989).
88 Concord Real Estate CDO 2006-1, Ltd. v. Bank of Am., 996 A.2d 324, 331 (Del.

Ch. 2010) ("Courts'strive to give indenture provisions a consistent and uniform meaning
because '[u]niformity in interpretation is important to the efficiency of capital markets."'
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Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson,8 9 a Delaware Supreme Court case applying
New York law. 90 The court held that, although certificates issued with respect to
debt issuances were "hopelessly unclear on the very point at issue," and although
courts confronted with ambiguous language normally consider extrinsic evidence
in an effort to discern the parties' intent, it would nevertheless be inappropriate to
do so in the bond financing context. 91 Citing Sharon Steel and echoing the
Imperative, the court explained its "reluctan[ce] to risk disuniformity by adverting
to evidence of the course of negotiation in a setting in which the same language
can be found in many different contracts," because disuniformity would be
detrimental to financial markets. 9 2 To resolve the dispute, the court applied a
tiebreaker rule, interpreting the disputed language against the issuer as drafter,
thereby upholding the imputed expectations of the debt holders. The court's
decision relied, in part, upon the notion that the current pool of debt holdersalthough technically parties to the indenture agreements-were not actively
engaged in the negotiation process.93 State and federal courts applying New York
law continue to adhere to this rule in the context of debt securities, and have
expanded it to include a range of financing contracts.94
As the preceding sections reveal, the Imperative is a dominant paradigm in the
jurisprudence of finance and lending. Because of this Imperative, judicial decisionmaking in the finance and lending realm reflects a number of normative
assumptions regarding the role of courts in financial and economic affairs. As a
result, certain highly conservative interpretive methodologies reign supreme. The
following section explores the underlying economic theory and assumptions
reflected in Imperative-driven decisions.

(alteration in original)); FleetBoston Fin. Corp. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Advanta Corp., No.
16912-NC, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8, at *71 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2003) ("[R]ules of contract
construction require that the term be.given the meaning commonly understood in the credit
card industry, as established by the record.").
89 681 A.2d 392 (Del. 1996).
9' Id. at 397-98.
91

92

Id

Id. at 398.
Id. at 398-99.
94 "Under New York law, when interpreting an indenture or contract ... [i]f the
contract is ambiguous, it should be resolved against the party who prepared or presented
the document." Whitebox Convertible Arbitrage Partners, L.P. v. IVAX Corp., 482 F.3d
1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Acuity Capital Management, LLC v. MGI Pharma,
Inc., Civil No. 08-5434, 2009 WL 2461719, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2009) (expressing the
same rule when applying New York law).
93
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III. THE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS AND PREVAILING METHODOLOGIES
OF THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE

Beneath the rhetoric, the Imperative is fundamentally a normative viewpoint
95
based upon relatively thin conceptions of neoclassical economic analysis of law.
Imperative-driven rulings are rooted in the belief that financial markets are vital to
the national interest, and therefore judges ought to decide cases in this realm in a
manner that advances broad economic efficiency goals. 96
A basic assumption of the prevailing neoclassical economic model9 7 is that
persons largely behave egocentrically and rationally, that they collect relevant
information, weigh costs and benefits, and make choices in accordance with
preferences designed to maximize expected utility.98 Economists measure "utility
maximization" on an individual or aggregate basis, with aggregate models
considering the welfare of all market participants taken together. 99 In finance and
lending jurisprudence, as in other areas of law that share a strong nexus with
economic affairs, 00 courts strive to advance market efficiency and stability. This
9 On neoclassical economic analysis generally, see sources cited infra note 97. On
the effect of neoclassical thought on legal analysis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972) (explaining that the common law largely reflects a goal of

advancing economic efficiency); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (exploring Posner's arguments
further).
96 The allure of economic analysis in areas of vital importance is noted in Jody S.
Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical
Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 357 (2007) ("[E]conomic
analysis provides traction on countless doctrinal puzzles on which other theories-and
deontic moral theories in particular-provide little purchase.").
9 The prevailing neoclassical model can be traced to Adam Smith and David Ricardo,
who analyzed the interworkings of free markets from the decision-making perspective of
individual economic actors. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1892); DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1817). Additional refinements were made by a
number of subsequent theorists. See, e.g., W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1871)
(exploring Smith's and Ricardo's arguments through formal,
mathematical analysis); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (James Dingwall &
Bert F. Hoselitz trans., 1976) (1871) (building upon Smith's and Ricardo's theories as to
the nature of individual decision in the marketplace, and establishing the Austrian school of
economics).
98 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Theory and the Hypothesis of Rationality, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE: UTILITY AND PROBABILITY 25 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990).
99 The welfare economics school of thought has become inextricably linked with
redistributive goals, but the earliest works are also responsible for identifying macro-level

utility that is a function of the individual utility-seeking decisions of a society's members.
See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912).
100 Social welfare also figures prominently in antitrust

jurisprudence: "U.S. courts

have repeatedly spoken of the goal of antitrust law in terms of promoting 'consumer
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stems not only from a strict market-oriented perspective, but also from a more
utilitarian view of societal welfare enhancement. In other words, cases in this
realm reflect a prevailing view that social welfare ultimately improves when
market efficiency improves.' 0 '
In economic terms, the essential predicate to an efficient market is a
competitive market-free from excessive regulation and potential externalities.10 2
Under the prevailing theory, markets are competitive when each underlying
transaction is efficient.1 03 Contracts freely negotiated by sophisticated parties are
deemed to be complete and efficient to the extent they represent perfect
information at the time of execution and, by their terms, account for all possible
contingencies that may interfere with performance.1 04 Even contracts with
welfare."' Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger
Standards of the United States, Canada,and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423,

430 (2005).
10' A report from the European Investors' Working Group articulates the perceived
connection between market efficiency and social welfare:
The efficient functioning of financial markets allows easier and cheaper
access to capital for firms, in order to boost employment and growth. Investors
play a crucial role in promoting efficiency, through the provision of liquidity
that can be fuelled towards welfare-increasing activities. Investment
alternatives, easy access to capital and investor protection may stimulate market
efficiency and provide more opportunities to increase social welfare.
EUROPEAN INVESTORS' WORKING GRP., RESTORING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN EUROPEAN
CAPITAL MARKETS 11 (2d ed. March 2010), availableat http://www.cfainstitute.org/ethics/

Documents/european investors workinggroup report.pdf.
102 Belief in the natural efficiency of a free market is articulated in the famous
"invisible hand" metaphor of Adam Smith:
As every individual . . . endeavours as much as he can both to employ his

capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its
produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to
render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed,
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is
promoting it.

. .

. [H]e intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many

other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention.
SMITH, supra note 97, at 455-56.
103 Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES
IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 81 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (where transactions are inefficient, the market as
a whole can become less efficient).
'04 On the completeness of contracts generally, see THOMAS J. MICELI, THE
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAw 90 (2d ed. 2009); BERNARD SALANII,

THE ECONOMICS OF

CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 161-90 (2d ed. 2005). In securities law, courts have incorporated
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seemingly ineffective terms are deemed complete and efficient when they reflect a
degree of satisficing or assumption of risk that the parties considered appropriate
relative to the overall transaction. 0 5 Accordingly, any externally imposed
deviation from contract terms reduces overall efficiency. Thus, at least in theory,
judicial revision of even the most egregious contract terms is unnecessary-any
inefficient allocation mandated by the terms would be renegotiated by the parties
to the extent the overall utility loss exceeds the transaction costs of renegotiating
the terms. 06
Because of these assumptions, governmental regulation of any sort is believed
to introduce market inefficiencies; these concerns are particularly heightened in the
finance and lending realm, where regulation is generally perceived to be one-sided
and protective of borrowers or consumers.'0 7 In essence, the imputed expectations
of lenders and financial institutions are looked upon as proxies for market
equilibrium in the absence of regulation. In the context of judicial decisionmaking, the gap between these institutions' expectations and any interpretation
rendered by a court provides a rough measure of market regulation introduced by
the decision. In light of these prevailing views, and because financial institutions
serve as intermediaries of market risk, it is easy to understand why courts are
reticent to exercise the full range of judicial authority in this arena. 08
Also implicit in finance and lending jurisprudence is an assumption that no
other interests-such as those rooted in equitable principles-are sufficient to
overcome any potential reduction in market efficiency. Furthermore, a court may
recognize that an allocation under a competitive market exchange might not
advance interests of fairness and equity, but may still decline to intervene out of
fear that intervention will have consequences far beyond the particular
controversy.109 Consequently, a court adhering to the Imperative adopts a
presumption that law reform or expansive analysis of any sort will impair market
the principle of completeness thusly: "[t]here are two core requirements for an efficient
market: 'large numbers of rational and intelligent investors,' and 'important current
information' that is 'almost freely available to all participants."' In re Initial Pub. Offering
Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Paolo Cioppa, The Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis Revisited: Implications of the Economic Model for the United
States Regulator, 5 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES 1, 5-6 (2005)).

ios As the Delaware Court of Chancery noted, when negotiating transactions,
sophisticated parties "make their own judgments about the risk they should bear." Abry
Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acq. LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1061 (Del. Ch. 2006).
106 This is essentially the Coase theorem, which is explored infra note 326 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of transaction costs, see Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON.

233 (1979).
107

See Levitin, supra note 27.

This is implicit in the language used by courts when deferring to the expectations
of lenders. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 186.
108

109

See supra note 72.
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efficiency. Under this perspective, judicial decision-making in the financial realm
poses a potentially dangerous externality. Thus, judicial decisions are narrowly
tailored to strict construction and passive enforcement of contracts.'o
Just as the rhetoric of the Imperative can be more readily understood in its
historical context, so, too, can its underlying theoretical assumptions be more
readily understood in the context of the leading economic theories of the 1970s and
1980s. Essentially, the Imperative strongly reflects precepts of the Chicago School,
with Imperative-driven courts doing their part to avoid excessive governmental
intervention in financial transactions."' In the broadest terms, the Imperative seeks
to preserve freedom of contract, which is central to the libertarian ideal of an
unregulated, competitive market.112 The Imperative also hints at fundamental
assumptions of this era: markets are inherently stable absent governmental
intervention of any form, including via judicial decisions. Instability, it was
believed, can be injected only from external sources, and once injected, may bring
dangerous consequences.1 3 Furthermore, each contract or transaction represents a
complete and perfectly efficient exchange. In light of the interconnectedness of
these transactions, externally injected inefficiencies-even with respect to just one
discrete transaction-are capable of causing a dangerous ripple effect."14

110 In cases outside of the finance realm, the Supreme Court has addressed the
relationship between judicial construction and enforcement of contracts, on the one hand,
and market efficiency, on the other hand. In an airline antitrust case, the Court explained
the importance of federal airline deregulation laws in promoting "maximum reliance on
competitive market forces." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1995).
However, in ruling that the federal laws did not preempt application of state contract law to
claims arising under agreements entered between the airlines and customers, the Court
explained, "market efficiency requires effective means to enforce private agreements." Id.
"The stability and efficiency of the market depend fundamentally on the enforcement of
agreements freely made, based on needs perceived by the contracting parties at the time."
Id.
.' See supra notes 41, 43, 44 and accompanying text.
112 Preservation of free markets was the primary normative goal of the Chicago
School. See supranotes 41, 43, 44 and accompanying text.
1 Classic works have argued that interventionist fiscal policy, far from being neutral,
causes uncertainty and instability in financial markets. See LUDWIG VON MISES, THE
THEORY OF MONEY AND CREDIT (H.E. Baston trans., Liberty Classics 1980) (1934).
14 Courts take particular notice of such ripple effects in the context of cases
concerning alleged harm to lenders. Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010)
("The current economic crisis highlights the full impact of the misrepresentation of risk in
the credit market. The impact is on creditors, consumers, and on the economy. When
creditors take on too many risky contracts, whether due to their own carelessness or the
misrepresentations of their customers, they are likely to suffer enormous economic harm,
and the resulting effects on society can be devastating."). But see A.I. Credit Corp. v.
Jamaica, 666 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting the potentially devastating
economic, financial, and foreign policy consequences of a ruling on the foreign-borrower,
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In contrast, this perspective assumes that judicial decisions that seek only to
construe and enforce a contract comply with libertarian economic thought. Indeed,
even Robert Nozick's classical conception of the "minimal state" deemed the
enforcement of freely entered contracts to be an acceptable level of governmental
involvement in societal affairs." 5 To this end, the Imperative-abiding court does
nothing more than silently assist the invisible hand.
Of course, the normative goal of efficiency in financial markets may, at times,
conflict with other societal goals. For instance, strong public outcries in the wake
of financial crises may necessitate judicial intervention. As a result, in certain
subfields of corporate finance, such as securities law, the Imperative has grown to
serve as an ideological presumption that must compete with other traditional goals,
like equity and fairness. In these cases, assumptions of the rational actor model
have led to a more expansive decisional approach. These analyses are typically
rooted in the Pareto measure of efficiency,11 6 whereby an allocation of resources is
said to be "Pareto superior" to another allocation "if and only if no person is
disadvantaged by it and the lot of at least one person is improved."" 7 In most
cases, economists apply the modified, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or "potential Pareto
superiority" model, whereby an outcome is deemed more efficient if those who
benefit are theoretically able to compensate those who are disadvantaged."' Under
approaches like this, judges strive to reallocate rights and remedies among parties
to a contract, transaction, or other exchange,"l 9 thereby achieving allocative

but finding that consideration of such consequences are beyond the scope of the federal
district court).
"'
116

NOZICK, supra note 44, at 26.
See RICHARD LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

11, 94,
is
if
there
optimal"
to
be
"Pareto
is
deemed
exchange
382 (Dryden Press 6th ed. 1976). An
at
participant
every
and
off
better
one
participant
least
at
that
makes
no other exchange
least as well off. In other words, a Pareto optimal outcome cannot be improved upon
without impairing at least one participant. See id. at 11.
"7 JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 72 (1988).
118 Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) ("[W]here a certain policy leads to an

increase in physical productivity, and thus of aggregate real income, the economist's case
for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of the comparability of individual
satisfactions . . . "); see also J. R. Hicks, The Foundationsof Welfare Economics, 49

ECON.

J. 696 (1939) (advancing a theory of general equilibrium that takes into consideration
individual compensation to reach efficient market exchanges); Brian N. Wasankari et al.,
Of DistributiveJustice in Economic Efficiency: An IntegratedTheory of the Common Law,
in 19 RES. L. & ECoN.,139, 142-53 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & William Kovacic eds., 2000)

(providing thorough discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency model).
"9 See Omri Ben-Shahar, A BargainingPower Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM.
L. REv. 396, 401-04 (2009) (describing the surplus-maximization principle in commercial
gap-filling cases).
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efficiency between conflicting interests while offsetting an inequitable market
allocation.120

Most notably, in the area of securities law, which is a subfield of corporate
finance, modem courts frequently extinguish flickers of the Imperative. Thus, the
judiciary has, over time, assumed a more active role in law reform. 12 1 An example
of the evolving balancing approach is the Third Circuit's decision in Newton v.
Merrill Lynch. The court acknowledged a legitimate argument against class
certification in a securities case, but proceeded to certify the class because judicial
action was needed to remedy an injustice. The court explained:
[T]he Securities Industry Association contends we should be wary of
extending class certification to cases where the court will in effect set
market standards (such as "best execution") and, by doing so, affect the
certainty of capital markets. Generally, it is desirable for these types of
changes to occur through rule making by the appropriate agency. But
courts should not hesitate to provide remedies for litigants injured by
unlawful conduct that may not clearly violate regulatory standards.12 2
Additional cases in the realm of securities law have demonstrated a similar
analysis,123 whereby a court acknowledges arguments resting upon the Imperative,
but then notes that it must proceed under a more expansive interpretive regime due
to the nature of the controversy and the concomitant need for judicial action to
promote interests of fairness and equity.' 24 Courts reach outcomes of this sort even
in the face of powerful Imperative-driven dissenting arguments.1 25 These decisions
120

Allocative efficiency is a core concern of microeconomic theory. See, e.g., Harvey

Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency," 56 AM.

ECON. REV.

392 (1966)

(introducing a theory of "X-efficiency" with respect to production output, which depends
upon allocative efficiency).
121 See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d
Cir. 1973) ("The securities laws seek to prevent restrictions which distort the market's
estimate of value. . . . Congress and the courts justifiably have outlawed all unfair and
deceptive practices related to the trading of securities and have encouraged private damage
actions to implement the enforcement of the federal securities laws."); see also JAMES H.
LORIE, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY FOR AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 3
(1974) (explaining that securities law is intended to advance efficiency and stability in
financial markets).
122 Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154, 165-66 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001).
123 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 254 (1988) (White,
J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing a fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance by
investors on allegedly material misrepresentations).
124 See, e.g., In re Adler, 247 B.R. 51, 127 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999) ("[W]e will not
permit the Claimants to reap the benefits of the fraud of Hanover and its agents.").
125 Dissenting to a rebuttable presumption supported by a fraud-on-the-market
theory
of reliance, Justice White noted:

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1483 2011

UTAH LAW REVIEW

1484

[No. 4

acknowledge that law reform might impair utility maximization in financial
markets. However, they ultimately find that other normative goals, such as investor
protection, are sufficiently compelling to offset any consequences.
Securities jurisprudence-much like antitrust jurisprudence-challenges the
Imperative's core belief that markets are inherently efficient. Perfect competition is
a basic tenet of market efficiency, and perfect competition relies upon the
assumption that there are enough participants and commodities in the commercial
marketplace that no single market participant may influence price. Yet courts
presiding over securities cases see ample evidence to refute these idealized
academic assumptions. As a result, courts have developed a fact-intensive,
standards-based doctrine to evaluate market efficiency, with factors considering
both quantitative and qualitative indicia of market dynamics.126 Where courts
identify inefficiencies, they strive to render decisions that correct sub-optimal,
inefficient, or inequitable allocations.127
As a result, courts reject the wisdom of passive, Imperative-driven paradigms
in the realm of securities law, and grapple with financial and economic questions
Congress, with its superior resources and expertise, is far better equipped than
the federal courts for the task of determining how modem economic theory and
global financial markets require that established legal notions of fraud be
modified. In choosing to make these decisions itself, the Court ... embarks on a
course that it does not genuinely understand, giving rise to consequences it
cannot foresee.
Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 254 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
White further notes "the dangers when economic theories replace legal rules as the basis
for recovery." Id. at 253. Justice White concludes, "I cannot join the Court in its effort to

reconfigure the securities laws, based on recent economic theories, to better fit what it
perceives to be the new realities of financial markets." Id at 255.
126 The test for market efficiency set forth in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,
1286-87 (D.N.J. 1989), has been applied in a number of recent cases. See, e.g., In re Am.
Int'l. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157, 175-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying the
Cammer test to determine whether the market for certain debt securities was efficient); In
re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 81, 94-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (applying the
Cammer test to determine whether the market for certain equity securities was efficient).
Cammer sets forth a five-prong inquiry for determining whether the market for a particular
security is efficient, including, inter alia, trading volume, the number of analysts tracking
the security, and the nature of the relationship between unexpected events and the
security's price. 711 F. Supp. at 1286-87. Additional factors are at times considered
alongside those included in the Cammer test. See, e.g., Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D.
467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (exploring additional factors suggestive of market efficiency,
such as market capitalization, bid-ask spread, and float).
127 Allocative efficiency is a fundamental goal of statutory law in the securities realm.
Mandatory disclosure reflects the normative belief that market efficiency is achieved when

information is optimally allocated for use by all market participants. See George J. Stigler,
The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
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from the bench. Moreover, although federal securities laws are largely statutory in
nature (with an extensive regulatory framework to which the deference rule
applies) the judiciary has taken an active role in establishing doctrine to construe
complex statutory provisions 28 or to address circumstances where there is no rule

on point.12 9
Yet notwithstanding these developments in securities law, more expansive
analyses, like allocative efficiency models, have been largely unable to take root in
other areas of corporate finance. Given that the vast majority of corporate
financing activity occurs pursuant to private transactions between highly
sophisticated parties, theoretical assumptions regarding a perfectly competitive and
inherently efficient market continue to prevail. Against this backdrop, any
discussion of the judiciary's role in financial transactions necessarily touches on
broader notions of efficacy of judicial involvement in economic affairs. It also
illuminates the interconnections among law reform, commercial certainty, systemic
risk, and market efficiency.
As a result, the Imperative continues to discourage judicial interventions in
free markets, and further wams that more expansive methodologies carry
substantial risk: any failed attempt to redistribute economic surplus or legal rights
and obligations may contribute to market failure. Thus, in areas of finance and
lending beyond securities law, the Imperative's underlying market stability goals
continue to be paramount and no other normative goals have been advanced at
their expense. Firthermore, the basic assumption of a perfectly competitive and
inherently efficient market has remained dominant. The following sections explore
how these assumptions translate into specific judicial methodologies in the finance
and lending realm.
A. Restraint and Deference

The Imperative advances a methodology of restraint and deference. 3 0 To
some extent, this methodological association is derived from the Imperative's early
See James J. Park, Rule JOB-5 and the Rise of the Unjust EnrichmentPrinciple, 60
DUKE L.J. 345 (2010) (describing the evolution of common law unjust enrichment theories
128

in securities jurisprudence); Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to
Disclose Under Rule 1Ob-5, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1639 (2004) (discussing the role of the
judiciary in developing legal standards for the duty to disclose).
129 See, e.g., Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 135 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is
no statute, rule, regulation, or interpretation, by the SEC or by a court, that [would remedy
the dispute]. This absence of precedent did not, however, absolve the district court of the
duty to resolve the plaintiffs' securities fraud claim once it was presented in this suit.").
130 in contrast to the phrase "judicial restraint," "judicial activism" is often used as
political rhetoric; however, when divorced from normative assumptions, the term
essentially refers to the legitimacy of judicial decision-making. By "legitimacy" it is meant
that a court has properly deferred to some other actor that is better suited to analyze the
issue (such as Congress, the executive branch, or the states), but also that it has not blindly
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intertwining with deference rule jurisprudence.' 3 ' To be sure, in the many cases
that invoke the Imperative, judicial deference has roots in recognized principles
that apply to cases unrelated to the finance and lending realm.132 Yet other times,
courts' language hints at a brand of deference that is not dictated by familiar
doctrine, but rather elected to avoid disrupting the legal status quo.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit considered whether regulations promulgated
under the Truth in Lending Act (the "Act") barred a credit card issuer's imposition
of penalty rates that were otherwise permissible under the cardholder agreement.133
The court acknowledged that the applicable regulation and comment were both
ambiguous, and, with little explanation of its reasoning, proceeded to enforce the
cardholder agreement.1 34 In concluding remarks, the court noted its reliance on
horizontal stare decisis with respect to nonbinding coordinate and lower court
decisions:
[O]ne court of appeals and at least six district courts have interpreted the
ambiguous [regulation and comment]. All have held, as our district court
did, that banks may apply higher, penalty rates of interest to the entire
billing cycle in which the consumer's default occurs. These decisions are
sensible, and we agree with them.' 35
Similarly, in a twist on federal preemption doctrine, the Third Circuit supported a
ruling in part by asserting that any per se rule recognizing a fiduciary duty of
banks to their commercial borrowers would likely be preempted by a subsequent

act of Congress.136
Essentially, judicial deference and restraint-as well as strict, textualist
interpretive norms-appear to be rooted in pragmatic concerns that the judiciary is
ill-equipped to assess financial and economic information. For instance, in
Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig,'3 7 the Supreme Court noted if the Sixth
Circuit's decision was upheld, it "would prove unworkable to creditors and, more

deferred such that a decision is divorced from legal precedent or the present realities. See
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS (2008).

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Section II.A (discussing deference rule jurisprudence).
"3 Swanson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 559 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2009).
134 Id. at 654-56.
'31 Id. at 656 (citations omitted).
136 Wash. Steel Corp. v. TW Corp., 602 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Given the
'3'

132

need for uniform rules in an area so vital to our national economy as banking, any state
common law rule that we might imply would likely give way to the preemptive force of
federal law.").
'3 541 U.S. 232 (2004).
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importantly, lead to significant confusion for consumers.""
The Court
admonished the lower court for adopting a "case-by-case approach" pursuant to
doctrinal analysis that the Court found to lack "textual support." 39 In particular,
the Court criticized the Sixth Circuit's decision that certain regulatory language
conflicted with the Act, asserting that the court "ignored [the] warning that 'judges
ought to refrain from substituting their own interstitial lawmaking for that of the
[Board]."'l 40 The Court suggested that the Sixth Circuit's error was caused by a
"fundamental misunderstanding of the workings of the credit card industry," and
that, in light of such complexities, it is important to apply strict interpretive norms
and defer to agency guidance.14' Thus, in the Supreme Court's view, deference is a
form of risk aversion.
To be sure, these concerns have appeared in cases beyond the finance and
lending realm. For instance, the Supreme Court articulated a similar form of risk
aversion in a decision regarding a Commerce Clause challenge to a sales and use
tax structure favoring local distribution companies.14 2 Declining to meddle with the
existing statutory framework, the Court explained it was "institutionally unsuited
to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and
professionally untrained to make them." 4 3 The Court further explained that the
judicial branch should abstain from lawmaking in this realm and defer any
necessary reform to the legislative branch. "Congress has the capacity to
investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judiciary could match .. . to run
economic risks that the Judiciary should confront only when the constitutional or
statutory mandate for judicial choice is clear." 4 4 In the financial realm, the sheer
magnitude and complexity of the transactions at stake heighten these sorts of
concerns. In essence, the world of finance and lending is, to some extent, a perfect
storm to the judiciary-when cases arise with greater frequency following an
economic crisis, the Imperative provides welcome justification for minimal judicial
involvement.

Id. The language reflects arguments raised in support of the credit card issuers:
"lenders operating nationwide or regional credit programs would be paralyzed by judicial
rulemaking, which might impose different disclosure requirements from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 Household Credit Servs.,
Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232 (2004) (No. 02-857).
139 Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 244 (2004).
138

id.
Id. at 244-45.
142 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
43
1 Id. at 308.
144 Id. at 309. Congress "may inform itself through factfinding procedures such as
hearings that are not available to the courts." Id. at 309 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 389 (1983)).
140
141
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B. Statutory Restrictions on More Expansive InterpretiveAnalyses

In addition to its continued influence on judicial methodology in the finance
and lending realm, the Imperative has also sparked legislative reforms that have
further disempowered courts. 14 5 Indeed, such laws at least partially explain why
approaches to judicial decision-making in other areas of finance and lending have
not evolved to the degree that they have in securities law; these statutes essentially
lock courts into a highly restrictive decisional model.
At the federal level, many enactments that were primarily intended to limit
application of statutory and regulatory rules to certain financing arrangements had
the indirect consequence of limiting opportunities for courts to apply more
expansive interpretive norms. For instance, in 1990, revisions to the Bankruptcy
Code expressly excluded a range of commercial financing agreements from most
provisions of the Code, and thus from the broad legal and equitable purview of
bankruptcy courts.14 6 In 2005, Congress updated these provisions to exclude a
wider range of instruments. 147 As the legislative history of these amendments
reveals, the Imperative was a primary force. For instance, the 1990 amendments
were motivated by a desire to prevent impairment of market stability resulting
from "uncertainties regarding the treatment of . .. financial instruments under the
Bankruptcy Code." 4 8 Similar Imperative-rooted concerns are reflected in the
legislative history of the 2005 amendments.1 49 As a result of these provisions, most
financing arrangements, other than traditional loans, are excluded from the effects
of the automatic stay.150 More importantly, these provisions effectively remove
Indeed, the Imperative's rhetoric is so pervasive that legislation in the finance and
lending realm at times includes the phrase "legal certainty" in its title or headings. See
Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. § 27a-f (2006) (providing that no
over-the-counter derivative contract shall be unenforceable under any federal or state law
based on a failure to comply with the Commodity Exchange Act); Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 739, 124 Stat. 1379, 1729
(2010) (providing for regulatory authority with respect to swap arrangements).
146 The excluded agreements are defined in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, as
further amended in 2005. For a thorough discussion, see Thomas J. Giblin, Financial
145

Markets in Bankruptcy Court: How Much Uncertainty Remains After BAPCPA?, 2009
COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 284 (2009).
147 See id. at 288-89. Congress introduced the amendments as part of the Bankruptcy

Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. See Franklin R. Edwards &
Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?,
22 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2005).
148 H.R. REP.

No. 10 1-484, at 1 (1990).

149 See Giblin, supra note 146, at 290-91 (quoting and discussing legislative history

found in H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, pt. 1, at 20 n.78 (2005)).
1so The automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) of the Bankruptcy Code
mandates that, as of the time a bankruptcy case is filed, virtually all acts and proceedings
against the debtor or against any assets of the estate, including the termination of a contract
or the exercise of setoff rights, are halted and subject to the court's determination.

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1488 2011

2011]

CONFRONTING THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE

1489

sweeping categories of financial agreements from the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy bench, as well as from the flexible and contextual standards commonly
applied by these courts.'o
9
Likewise, provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999152 excluded a
range of financing arrangements from the definition of "securities" under federal
securities laws. These provisions therefore rendered these agreements beyond
Securities and Exchange Commission regulation. The Legal Certainty for Bank
Products Act of 2000'15 achieved a similar result with respect to the statutory reach
of federal commodities laws. These enactments largely focused on limiting
regulatory oversight with respect to certain instruments that take the form of
private contracts. However, they also caused an indirect curtailment of judicial
interpretive authority, as financial instruments expressly excluded from these laws
would not be subject to many of the broader doctrines developed under securities
and commodities jurisprudence.154 More fundamentally, these legislative
enactments have the indirect effect of removing a range of instruments from
potential exposure to a growing body of judge-made securities law. In this
jurisprudence the Imperative's efficiency goals are trumped by interests like

' Giblin, supra note 146, at 302-04; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05
(1939) ("The bankruptcy courts have exercised these equitable powers ... to the end that

fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done."); Loc. Loan Co. v.
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (stating that bankruptcy courts are "invested 'with such

jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy proceedings"'); Mark D. Rosen, NonformalisticLaw in Time and Space, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 622, 631 (1999) (arguing that the Bankruptcy Code's heavy reliance on
standards-based analyses allows courts flexibility to apply local law).
152 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15, 16 U.S.C.). The Dodd-Frank Act
substantially modifies portions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1379, 1729 (2010).
15 Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 27-27f). The Dodd-Frank Act
substantially modifies portions of the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act. Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1379, 1729 (2010).
154 However, it is important to note one important area where securities jurisprudence
continues to apply to swap agreements. Under the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act
of 2000, "security-based swap agreements" remain subject to specific fraud, manipulation,
and insider trading prohibitions contained in the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, including judicial decisions promulgated with respect to such

statutes, to the same extent that such laws are applicable to securities. See 7 U.S.C. §
la(47)(A)(v) (Supp. II 2010) (defining "security-based swap agreement" as a swap
agreement of which "a material term is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any
security or any group or index of securities, including any interest therein").
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fairness, equity, and investor protection, and courts actively grapple with the
economic substance of arrangements.' 5 5
With respect to an even wider range of financing arrangements, a wave of
credit-specific statutes of frauds' 56 passed in the 1980s and 1990s further
restricting judicial interpretive methodology.' 57 Consider, for instance, the
language of the Minnesota credit-specific statute of frauds: "A debtor may not
maintain an action on a credit agreement unless the agreement is in writing,
expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions, and is signed
by the creditor and the debtor."' 5 8 At first blush this language appears only to
advance the ordinary purpose of a statute of frauds: to bar enforcement of oral
agreements. However, the statute goes significantly farther. It prevents recognition
of any relationship between lenders and borrowers with respect to financing
arrangements other than those forth in a written contract.
The statute provides:
The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a new credit
agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of
subdivision 2: (1) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a
debtor; (2) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or (3) the
agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering into a
new credit agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior
credit agreements, or extending installments due under prior credit

agreements.1 59

1ss See supra Section III.B.
116 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-9-2(7) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective May 3, 1989);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010(a)(13) (2010) (effective Aug. 9, 1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 44-101(9) (2011) (approved 1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-59-101(d) (2011) (effective
Mar. 14, 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124 (2011) (effective Mar. 15, 1989); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714(b) (2011) (effective Mar. 29, 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 687.0304

(West 2011) (effective Oct. 1, 1989); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/2 (2011) (effective Sep. 1,
1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 535.17 (West 2011) (effective Jan. 1, 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 16-117 to -118 (2011) (effective Mar. 9, 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §432.045 (West 2011)
(approved July 10, 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-5 (2010) (effective Oct. 1, 1989); OHIO.
REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.02(C) (LexisNexis 2011) (effective April 9, 1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 41.580(1)(h) (2009) (approved Aug. 3, 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101(b)
(2011) (effective July 1, 1989); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.02 (West 2011)
(effective Sep. 1, 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4 (West 2011) (effective Apr. 24, 1989).

157 Bruce A. Kolbezen & Samuel A. Evig, The Colorado Credit Agreements Act and
Its Impact on Lenders and Borrowers, 36 COLO. LAW. 31, 31 (2007) ("The Colorado
legislature enacted the Statute in 1989, at the end of a financial institution crisis that

inicluded rising interest rates, changes to federal tax law, and an overextension of credit, all
of which contributed to instability in the lending industry.").
...MINN.
'

9

STAT.

§ 513.33(2)

(2010).

Id. § 513.33(3)(a).
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Finally, it concludes: "A credit agreement may not be implied from the
relationship, fiduciary or otherwise, of the creditor and the debtor." 60 Courts have
construed similar language in the Illinois credit-specific statute of frauds' 6 1 to bar
all actions that relate to the alleged credit agreement, whether those actions sound
in contract or in tort.16 2 Courts in other states have reached similar results,163
finding that the credit-specific statute of frauds bars claims such as unjust
enrichment,'16 breach of -fiduciary duty, interference with prospective business
advantage,' 65 and negligent misrepresentation.16 6
These statutes have considerable impact across a range of financing activities.
For instance, the Minnesota credit-specific statute of frauds is construed to apply to
financial accommodations of any sort, and not merely traditional loans.' 6 7 Courts in
a variety of jurisdictions have applied their respective credit-specific statutes of
frauds to a range of financial transactions, as well as to financial accommodations
that relate to an existing credit agreement.168
60

1d. § 513.33(3)(b).

161 815

ILL. COMP. STAT. 160/2 (2011).
First Nat'1 Bank in Staunton v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 138, 140-43
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that a bank's oral promise to hold a check until Monday so
that the customer could deposit additional funds was essentially a credit agreement and
therefore required a written agreement to be enforceable under the Illinois credit-specific
statute of frauds).
163 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Pitkin Cnty. Bank & Trust Co., 931 P.2d 456, 458-59 (Colo.
App. 1995) (explaining the Colorado credit-specific statute of frauds is not limited to
contract claims or to those tort claims which seek the enforcement of a credit agreement).
16 Lang v. Bank of Durango, 78 P.3d 1121, 1123-24 (Colo. App. 2003).
165 Hewitt, 931 P.2d at 459-60.
166 See, e.g., Dixon v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 1304,
1309 (S.D. Fla.
2009).
167 See, e.g., Rural Am. Bank of Greenwald v. Herickhoff, 485
N.W.2d 702, 706
(Minn. 1992) (holding that a promise regarding the ordering of payments under two loan
facilities constituted a financial accommodation, and therefore a credit agreement, under
the Minnesota credit-specific statute of frauds); Chies v. Highland Bank, No. C8-00-1630,
2001 WL 214693, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (instructing that a bank's agreement to
subordinate its own security interest to another bank's interest constituted a "financial
accommodation" within the meaning of the Minnesota credit-specific statute of frauds).
161 See, e.g., Univex Int'l., Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 914 P.2d 1355, 1358
(Colo. 1996) (en banc) (finding Colorado's credit-specific statute of frauds "does not apply
only to claims involving transactions which are characterized exclusively as credit
agreements, but also ... to claims which merely relate to credit agreements"); Bank One,
Springfield v. Roscetti, 723 N.E.2d 755, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (concluding that the oral
modification of a guarantee fell within the Illinois credit-specific statute of frauds because
the guarantee constituted part of a comprehensive credit agreement). But see Keenan v.
Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 529 F.3d 569, 579 (5th Cir. 2008) ("The situation of
two lenders entering an accommodation as to a third-party borrower" is outside the scope
of the Louisiana credit-specific statute of frauds).
162
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Credit-specific statutes of frauds are undoubtedly rooted in the Certainty
Imperative.'" 9 As the legislative histories of many states reveal, 1 70 these statutes
were adopted in response to lobbying efforts by banking interests, who argued that
a credit-specific statute of frauds might advance certainty in the law governing
financial transactions. 17 ' Courts have not resisted the infringement imposed by
these statutes on judicial decision-making autoriomy, as countless decisions have
emphasized that these laws are extremely broad and ought to be applied as written,
72
even though the results of that application may at times seem harsh.1
Furthermore, some variations of these statutes, such as the Colorado credit-specific
statute of frauds, expressly bar claims such as part performance and promissory
estoppel, further restricting the ability of courts to develop common law exceptions
to the statutory requirements.173

169

King v. Parish Nat'l Bank, 885 So. 2d 540, 546 (La. 2004) ("The primary

legislative purpose of these statutes was 'to establish certainty as to the contractual liability
of financial institutions,' which would in turn limit lender liability lawsuits based on oral
agreements." (quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell, 661 So. 2d 1325, 1329 (La.

1995))); Brown v. Founders Bank & Trust Co., 890 P.2d 855, 862 (Okla. 1994) (stating the
Oklahoma credit-specific statute of frauds is "intended to discourage lender liability
litigation and to promote certainty into credit agreements"); see also Todd C. Pearson,
Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN.
L. REv. 295, 299 (1991) ("[T]he general goal behind these credit agreement statutes is to

increase certainty in contractual liability in order to reduce lender liability litigation.").
See, e.g., Bill Analysis of H.B. 704 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm.,
of Md. (1989) (providing that with respect to a bill introducing the
Assembly
Gen.
Maryland credit-specific statute of frauds, "The intent of this bill is to .. . make[] certain
credit agreements . . . unenforceable unless they are in writing," as well as "protect lenders
against claims that the lender made a verbal promise to loan money and then refused to do
so, or that the lender verbally agreed to extend the terms of a loan," and that such goals
were commanded in part by an environment in which "multimillion dollar lawsuits [were]
1o

being filed and recovery [was] being made based on alleged verbal promises to lend and
based on modifications of existing loan agreements").
"' E.g., Todd C. Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written
Credit Agreement Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REv. 295, 299-300 nn.17-18 (1991) (citing
legislative history of a variety of credit-specific statutes of frauds).
172 See, e.g., Mach. Transps. of Ill. v. Morton Cmty. Bank, 687 N.E.2d 533, 535-36
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) ("[A]ll actions relying on an oral agreement are barred by the Act. We

reluctantly agree with [established precedent]. Our reluctance stems from our acute
awareness that strict application of this statute can easily lead to disastrous consequences in
the hands of unscrupulous lenders.").
1 COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-124(3) (2011); see Stephanie J. Shafer, Limiting Lender
Liability Through the Statute of Frauds, 18 CoLo. LAW. 1725, 1725-26 (1989); see also

Classic Cheesecake Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 546 F.3d 839, 847 (7th Cir. 2008)
(reviewing a claim of promissory estoppel with respect to an oral promise for commercial

financing, finding that the "case turns out to be a routine promissory estoppel case, and that
is not enough in Indiana to defeat a defense of statute of frauds").
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Many of these statutes also curtail judicial consideration of facts and
circumstances relating to a written financing agreement. The Ohio credit-specific
statute of frauds provides:
The terms of a loan agreement subject to this section, including the
rights and obligations of the parties to the loan agreement, shall be
determined solely from the written loan agreement, and shall not be
varied by any oral agreements that are made or discussions that occur
before or contemporaneously with the execution of the loan
agreement.1 74
In many jurisdictions, similar language has been used to bar claims arising under
oral agreements that relate, in any way, to an existing financing agreement.175
When broadly construed, these laws effectively ensure that commercial
financing disputes are analyzed under strict interpretive norms. These norms
consist primarily of the rules of contract interpretation, without the influence of
doctrinal contract and tort law, equitable principles or, in certain cases, evidence of
surrounding facts and circumstances.
The pervasiveness of credit-specific statutes of frauds-and the fairly uniform
tendency for courts to strictly apply them-speaks volumes for the enduring
strength of the Imperative. However, the impact of these statutes in the commercial
marketplace is limited to a large degree by jurisdictional concentration. New York
law governs the vast majority of sophisticated corporate financing arrangements in
the United States, as well as a large portion of cross-border financing
arrangements.1 76 Although New York has not adopted a credit-specific statute of
frauds, New York's general statute of frauds is broad enough to cover most
financing arrangements, since it applies to contracts with a duration of more than
one year.'7 7 State courts in New York have ruled that this provision applies to bar
174

OHI-o REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.02(C) (2006).

175 For example, Colorado courts have applied the statute to bar a guarantor's claims
arising from an oral agreement discharging obligations under the original credit agreement.
See Pima Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Selby, 820 P.2d 1124, 1128 (Colo. App. 1991).
176 Even transactions without any substantial nexus to the state may select New York
law to govern commercial agreements, pursuant to a New York statute providing that
parties to any contract involving consideration of $250,000 or more "may agree that the
law of this state shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in part, whether or not such
contract, agreement or undertaking bears a reasonable relation to this state." N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2010).
1' N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 2001) provides:

Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some
note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement,
promise or undertaking . . . [b]y its terms is not to be performed within
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oral agreements regarding financing arrangements for which repayment extends
beyond one year.' 7 8 Furthermore, New York courts generally do not enforce
contractual rights or obligations unless clearly evidenced by a written
agreement.17 9 In fact, these courts are known for employing formalist,so textual
pursuant to an approach that has been described as: "formalistic,
analyses,
literalistic, nonjudgmental, and deferential to the freedom of parties to bargain for
mutual advantage."' 8 2
Moreover, the normative goals of the Certainty Imperative are firmly rooted
in New York commercial law. The Court of Appeals of New York, in resolving a
conflict of laws question pertaining to a commercial lending agreement, explained:
New York . . . is a financial capital of the world, serving as an

international

clearinghouse

and market place for a plethora of

international transactions . . . . In order to maintain its pre-eminent

financial position, it is important that the justified expectations of the
parties to the contract be protected.1 83
one year from the making thereof or the performance of which is not to
be completed before the end of a lifetime.
178

See, e.g., NES Energy Inc. v Mazzarro, No. 51,910, at *3 (Suffolk Cnty. Ct, Oct.

21, 2010) (applying New York's general statute of frauds to a loan agreement).
179 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1502 (2010) ("New York, with its strong preference for written
agreements, more stringently enforces the statute's requirements.").
180

See, e.g., Jordan Panel Sys. Corp. v. Turner Constr. Co., 841 N.Y.S.2d 561, 573

(N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (explaining that even where principles of equity invite an alternative

result, the contract at issue must be enforced as written: "we did not write those rules of
engagement, and we are not empowered either to ignore or rewrite them").
181 Miller, supra note 179, at 1478 ("New York judges are formalists. Especially in
commercial cases, they have little tolerance for attempts to re-write contracts to make them
fairer or more equitable, and they look to the written agreement as the definitive source of
interpretation."); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119
YALE L.J. 926, 928 nn.1-2 (2010) (identifying New York as a jurisdiction that relies on
textualist decision-making).
182 Miller, supra note 179, at
1522.

J. Zeevi and Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 333 N.E.2d 168, 172-73
(N.Y. 1975). Further,
[a] vast amount of international letter of credit business is customarily handled
by certain New York banks whose facilities and foreign connections are
particularly adaptable to this field of operation. The parties, by listing United

States dollars as the form of payment, impliedly accepted these facts and set up
procedures to implement their trust in our policies.
Id.
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Subsequent cases applying New York law in state and federal courts have echoed
these policy concerns. 18 4 The Second Circuit succinctly summarized New York
law's purpose as "promot[ing] certainty in international financial markets."' 85 In
light of these interests, New York courts are mindful of the effect of their decisions
on financial markets. For instance, the Supreme Court for New York County
articulated the Imperative in a decision declining to extend common law fiduciary
duties in the context of a commercial bank financing the hostile takeover of its
corporate customer, noting that "a per se rule might unduly restrict banks in
providing credit to competing customers, and might thus unduly reduce the pool of
available credit."' 86
The convergence of state and federal statutory enactments with evolving
judicial norms means that the judiciary handles virtually all cases arising under
corporate financing arrangements lightly. Where controversies must be resolved,
they are decided under strict interpretive norms; namely, the rules of contract
interpretation. These rules essentially ensure that courts restrict their involvement
to strict construction and passive enforcement of financing contracts that are
deemed to be complete and perfectly efficient.
C. The Present State of the Imperative

The Imperative has moved quietly,'8 7 but steadily through the judicial and
legislative processes, and in so doing this jurisprudential vestige of the economic
Optopics Labs. Corp. v. Savannah Bank of Nigeria, Ltd., 816 F. Supp. 898, 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of N. Am., Ltd. v. J. L. M. Int'l, Inc., 421 F.
Supp. 1269, 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (quoting Zeevi and noting that "[t]he adoption of these
policy considerations to the present case serves to provide Natbank with a forum for a fair
determination of its claims").
185 Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 936 F.2d 723, 726 (2d
Cir. 1991).
186 ADT Operations, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 662 N.Y.S.2d 190,
195 (1997).
The court further explained, "Chase is a bank which has a national presence. Any rule
which might have such a broad impact should be considered by the legislature or
appropriate administrative or oversight agencies." Id.
187 The Imperative has moved quietly in that it has not previously been identified as
an overarching jurisprudential norm; however, the use of this rhetoric has not escaped
184

notice of those within the industry. See, e.g., Growth and Development of the Derivatives
Market: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade & Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking,

Hous. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 5-6 (2005) (statement of Joseph P. Bauman, CEO, JB
Risk Consulting, LLC) (emphasizing the importance of legal certainty as a rationale for
declining to extend regulations in the derivatives market, noting, "[i]n a way, market

discipline and legal certainty are a check and balance on the effective functioning and
growth of any market"); see also Joanna Perkins, Legal Certainty and the Role of the
FinancialMarkets Law Committee, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 155, 155-56 (2007) (detailing

the mission of a United Kingdom legal reform board, which seeks to guide courts and
legislative bodies so that "legal certainty" is protected).
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turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s has profoundly altered judicial decision-making
approaches in corporate finance. The Imperative's normative goals of subjectively
nuanced legal certainty and uniformity have become intertwined with judicial
restraint and deference. As a result, the state of corporate finance jurisprudence in
the United States can be summarized thusly: deference, in the very broadest sense,
is shown not only to the freedom of parties to contract, but also to the legal status
quo.
The Imperative is not confined to the American judicial landscape. It has also
taken root in the United Kingdom, where more expansive interpretive regimes are
likewise viewed as a threat to London-based financial markets.188 Yet, while
ostensibly a prevailing view, the Imperative is not without its discontents.
Demonstrating some emerging doubts as to the proper paradigm in finance and
lending cases, the Imperative was the subject of a lively debate between the
majority and dissenting opinions in a 2008 decision of the Supreme Court. In
Department of Revenue of Kentucky. v. Davis,'89 the Court considered whether the
Commonwealth of Kentucky's income tax structure violated the dormant
Commerce Clause to the extent it exempted from state income tax the interest on
bonds issued by Kentucky or its subdivisions, while taxing the interest on debt
securities from other states.' 90 The Court held that the income tax structure did not
run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, since the tax exemption favored a
traditional governmental function (the issuance of debt securities to pay for public
projects) without any differential treatment favoring local entities over
substantially similar out-of-state interests.' 9'
Conceding that the relevant provisions of the Commonwealth's tax code were
enacted with an eye toward ensuring the marketability of local bonds, the Court
noted an important interest in market stability: when the Commonwealth "issues
[its bonds] for sale in the bond market, it relies on that tax code, and seller and
purchaser treat the bonds and the tax rate as joined . . . intimately."' 92 The
Respondents asked the Court to apply the Pike balancing test to determine whether
188

See generally

CONTRACT LAW

FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW COMMITTEE, ISSUE

97 - EUROPEAN
(2010). This is a report prepared by a United Kingdom independent legal

reform board for submission to the UK Government Call for Evidence and Views to Inform
its Response with respect to adopting European contract law, which utilizes a substantially
more contextual and expansive interpretive regime than the United Kingdom and United
States. The report, prepared by members affiliated with banking and lending behemoths
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, among others, articulates the dangers to legal certainty
that arise from judicial lawmaking or more expansive interpretive regimes as applied to
contract disputes. For instance, the report notes that concepts such as good faith,
reasonableness and fair dealing, "may be expected to achieve substantively fair results, [but
are] less likely to achieve certainty of outcomes." Id. at 10.
9 553 U.S. 328 (2008).
190 Id.

'9'
92 Id.
1

at 352-53.

Id. at 348.
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the income tax structure imposed an excessive burden on commerce.' 93 Addressing
this request, the Court advanced the Imperative's message of judicial restraint:
[E]ven on the assumption that a Pike examination might generally be in
order in this type of case, the current record and scholarly material
convince us that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw
reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the
[Respondents] to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case.' 94
[Because such conclusions turn on] cost-benefit questions' 9 [of a
financial and economic nature, with respect to which a striking feature is]
not even the difficulty of answering them or the inevitable uncertainty of
the predictions that might be made in trying to come up with answers,
but the unsuitability of the judicial process . . . for making whatever
predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible at all. 196
The Court declined to strike down the differential taxation scheme, even
declining to consider more expansive analysis of the issues in the case, noting that
any other decision "to a certainty would upset the market in bonds and the settled
expectations of their issuers based on the experience of nearly a century."' 9 7
Finally, the Court expressed the root of its unwillingness to engage in law reform:
Id. at 353. The test was originally articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970). "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
19

local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." Id. at 142. Respondents in Davis asserted a number of excessive
burdens on commerce. See Davis, 553 U.S. at 353-54.
194 Davis, 553 U.S. at 353.
195 Id. at 355. The Court explained such cost-benefit questions and the role of the
judiciary thusly:
Is any court in a position to evaluate the advantage of the current market for
bonds issued by the smaller municipalities .

.

. ? Consider that any attempt to

place a definite value on this feature of the existing system would have to
confront the what-if questions. If termination of the differential tax scheme
jeopardized or eliminated most single-state funds . . . would some new source of
capital take their place? Would the interstate markets accommodate the small
issuers . . . or would the financing in question be replaced by current local
taxation for long-term projects . . . or would state governments assume

responsibility through their own bonds or by state. taxation? Or would capital . . .
dry up, eliminating a class of municipal improvements... . [And] what would
the effect be on interstate capital flows?
Id. at 354-55.
196 Id. at
355.
" Id. at 356.
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"While it is not our business to suggest that the current system be reconsidered, if
it is to be placed in question .

.

. an elected legislature is the preferable institution

for incurring the economic risks of any alteration in the way things have
traditionally been done."' 9 8 Shedding additional light ori the normative assumption
that law reform is damaging to financial markets, the majority explained:
[R]isk is the essence of what the [Respondents] are urging here. It would
miss the mark to think that . . . courts .

.

. are being invited merely to

tinker with details of a tax scheme; we are being asked to apply a federal
rule to throw out the system of financing municipal improvements." 9 9
Any such reforms would "expose the States to the uncertainties of . .. economic
experimentation." 200
The Court's concerns reflect the Imperative's key underlying assumption: that
any deviation from the legal status quo introduces systemic risk and instability to
an otherwise perfectly efficient market. Yet ironically, the majority in Davis calls
upon the Imperative to support a state practice that is arguably rooted in
protectionist economic policy: the early antithesis of neoclassical economic
thought.2 0' In this manner, the decision reveals just how entrenched the Imperative
has become-it dominates judicial decision-making irrespective of the underlying
economic principles at stake. Thus, although the Imperative was initially
intertwined with free market ideals, its methodology has become so pervasive that
it is applied even in support of protectionist policies. In essence, the Imperative is
no longer used chiefly as a means of advancing a particular nuanced economic
perspective, but rather to restrict courts from intervening at all in financial affairs.
In contrast, a dissenting opinion by Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Alito
joins, questions the majority's support for a decision that runs contrary to
important precedent in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 2 02 Extending an invitation
to expose these underlying assumptions to further judicial analysis, Justice
Kennedy explains:
Throughout the Court's argument is the concern that, were this law
to be invalidated, the national market for bonds would be disrupted. The
concern is legitimate, but if it is to be the controlling rationale the Court
should cast its decision in those terms. The Court could say there needs
198Id.
199 d.
200

d

Protectionism is often associated with classical mercantilism, which flourished in
the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Mercantilist thought focused upon the role of the state
in harnessing individual impulses to promote public welfare. See generally ELI F.
HECKSCHER, MERCANTILISM (E. F. Soderlund ed., 1955) (providing a thorough account of
protectionism and mercantilism).
202 Davis, 553 U.S. at 362-74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
201
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to be a sui generis exception, noting that the interstate discrimination has
been entrenched in many States and for a considerable time. That
rationale would prompt my own statement of disagreement as a matter of
principle and economic consequences, but it would be preferable to a
decision that misinterprets the Court's precedents. Instead, today the
Court weakens the preventative force of the Commerce Clause and
invites other protectionist laws, thus risking further dislocations and
market inefficiencies based on the origin of products and commodities
that should be traded nationwide and without local trade barriers.20 3
In essence, the dissent argues that the Certainty Imperative must not be used
to support decisions that are divorced from the very rules and precedent they
purport to be based upon. By generating decisions that are so perplexing, the
judiciary indeed disrupts legal certainty-not the subjective form that has evolved
in the finance and lending context, but rather the far more entrenched legal
certainty that has deep foundations in the common law. A disruption of the latter
can have consequences far beyond financial markets. This is a damning critique.
Setting aside deeper normative questions, if Imperative-driven decisions in fact do
little to promote legal certainty 204 then the continued paralysis of the judiciary is
misguided, unnecessary, and potentially destructive.
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion also calls into question the wisdom of
passive decision-making paradigms in cases that touch upon financial matters,
suggesting that concerns of market disruption should be articulated in decisions
and subjected to judicial consideration of the actual interplay between law reform
and economic consequences. 205 This exposure has the added benefit of testing the
soundness and resilience of the connection between any particular law reform and
stability in financial markets. Rather than seeking abstention, the dissent reveals a
willingness to grapple with financial and economic questions from the bench.
Further analyses of these and related questions are deeply needed. For one
thing, it is not entirely clear that the concept of "legal certainty," as it has come to
rest in corporate finance jurisprudence as a subjectively nuanced narrative, can be
a means of promoting long-term stability in financial markets.206 Clearly, the
preservation of legal certainty minimizes risk in transactional dealings generally.
Excessive risk of midstream unenforceability or re-characterization of transactions
203

Id. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

See Ofer Raban, The Fallacy ofLegal Certainty: Why Vague Legal StandardsMay
Be Better for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 176-77 (2010)
204

(examining "claims that clear legal rules produce the legal certainty and predictability
required by capitalism and liberalism," and finding that "the fallacy consists in identifying
people's ability to predict the consequences of their actions with lawyers' ability to predict
the consequences of applying the law").
205 Davis, 553 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
206 On the "narrative" of legal certainty in financial reform, see Joanna Benjamin,
The
NarrativesofFinancialLaw, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 787, 807-10 (2010).
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is disruptive to free markets.20 7 However, if the ultimate goal is market stability,
then emerging theories suggest that some degree of outcome-based uncertainty in
transactional law might actually reduce excessive risk-taking and moral hazard
effects208 that produce great instability from within financial markets. 2 0 9 Similarly,
contrary to widespread presumptions, it is not clear that markets actually are
inherently efficient, 2 10 or that judicial involvement is per se an impediment to
market stability. As the recent financial crisis illustrates, systemic risk in financial
markets can result from internal forces. 211 Markets are inherently cyclical, and to
the extent a natural contraction causes parties to default on interconnected
financing arrangements, the resultant confidence erosion, reduced liquidity, and
cross-default contagion can introduce substantial instability.2 12 In these instances,
courts may serve as an important intermediary, possessing sufficiently broad legal
and equitable powers to manage complex and fact-intensive disputes.
While arguments of this sort require careful interdisciplinary analysis, we can
ascertain one obvious failing of the Imperative: it remains steeped in rhetoric that
has not evolved despite decades of advancements in our understanding of financial
and economic activity.213 One commentator, writing on financial law reform in the
United Kingdom, summarized the dangers:

207

See generally

ROGER MCCORMICK, LEGAL RISK IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS

(2010) (providing a thorough overview of legal risk, with particular emphasis on the United
Kingdom financial markets).
208 Moral hazards arise where a party is insulated from certain risks that it would
otherwise normally bear; as a result, the insulated party is incentivized to behave
differently from how it would in the absence of insulation from the risk. See, e.g.,
KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING

142-43 (1971) (exploring

moral hazard in the context of insurance policies).
209 See KENT OSBAND, PANDORA'S RISK: UNCERTAINTY AT THE CORE OF FINANCE
79-91 (2011) (exploring Frank Knight's classic distinction between "uncertainty" and
"risk," and arguing that some degree of uncertainty is essential to healthy financial
markets); Alison M. Hashmall, After the Fall: A New Framework to Regulate "Too Big to
Fail" Non-Bank FinancialInstitutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 829, 830 (2010) (explaining that
some degree of outcome uncertainty in the law reduces moral hazard).

210

The efficient market hypothesis has recently come under attack, most notably by

behavioral economics and behavioral finance theorists. See, e.g.,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN

INTRODUCTION

ANDREI SHLEIFER,
TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 10-12 (2000)

(discussing emergent psychological evidence to refute the assumptions of investor
rationality).
211 "Systemic risk is fundamentally a contracting problem that arises when a large

number of parties cannot honor their commitments." Margaret M. Polski, Systemic Risk
and the U.S. FinancialSystem, MERCATUS ON POL'Y, May 2009, at 1, 3.
212 On systemic risk generally, see Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the
United States FinancialSystem, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 673 (2010).
213 On the scientific and philosophical evolution of knowledge in finance and
economics, see generally James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial
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A number of risks are inherent in a crude reliance on the power of
unanalyzed value-concepts such as legal certainty . . . [T]here is the

obvious danger that the concept of 'legal certainty' becomes fetishized,
and stands in the way of any real evaluation of the merits of law

reform.2 14
The Imperative seems to have reached just such a perilous point.
Underscoring the dangers of a rhetoric that relies upon untested assumptions,
consider congressional testimony in 2005 urging that credit default swaps continue
to be construed as private agreements rather than as futures contracts-the latter
designation would have rendered these instruments subject to extensive
regulations.215 The testimony noted the financial industry's fear that the judiciary
or legislature might impair the legal status quo through an adverse opinion as to the
characterization of swaps. It heralded the "legal certainty" achieved by Congress's
decision not to bring these financial instruments under the regulatory framework
applicable to futures contracts:
[P]rivately negotiated derivatives have continues [sic] to thrive and
product innovation has proceeded unabated. Even more importantly,
thanks in no small part to derivatives, the markets have been able to
withstand significant shocks to the financial system. The legal certainty
provided by the [broad exclusions and exemptions from the
Commodities Exchange Act] has been an important part of this

success. 2 16
Indeed, given the suspected role of excessive trading and poor risk management
with respect to unregulated derivatives in the recent financial crisis, these
arguments underscore the power of the Imperative's rhetoric.2 17 Perhaps the
Crisis of 2008: An IntellectualHistory of CorporateFinance Theory, 54 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1257 (2010).
214

See Perkins, supranote 187, at 163.

Growth and Development of the Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs,
215

109th Cong. 5-7 (2005) (statement of Joseph P. Bauman, CEO, JB Risk Consulting, LLC).
216
217

Id. at 6.
Professor Greenberger explained: "By removing the multi-trillion dollar swaps

market from the traditional norms of market regulation, a highly speculative derivative
bubble was created that was opaque to federal regulators and market observers alike." The
Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry

Commission 21 (2010) (testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor,
University of Maryland School of Law). As a result, "the swaps market permitted trillions
of dollars of financial commitments to be made with no assurance that those commitments
could be fulfilled beyond the highly illusory AAA ratings of the counterparties in
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Imperative is less a call for legal certainty than a call for legal complacencyeffectuated in part by tying the hands of the judiciary-and therein lies the true
danger to stability in modem financial markets.
IV. TESTING THE EFFICACY OF THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE'S
PREVAILING METHODOLOGIES

Strict Imperative-driven interpretive methodologies might do little to promote
efficiency, stability, and certainty in financial markets. For one thing, the
assumption that markets are perfectly efficient and inherently stable may be
misguided. 21 8 Furthermore, to the extent instability arises from within financial
markets, strict interpretive norms blind courts to economic realities and prevent
meaningful resolution of claims. Simply put, Imperative-driven methodologies
might not provide a sufficiently intricate framework to assess the complexities of
dynamic financing arrangements. In fact, there is a strong efficiency argument for
adopting a more expansive interpretive regime in corporate finance jurisprudence.
To some extent, the continued Imperative-driven reliance on strict interpretive
norms in finance and lending jurisprudence may reflect the relative infancy of
judicial law in this realm. Consider, for instance, the parallel jurisprudence of
corporate transactional law, which is also comprised of sophisticated and complex
private contracts. In particular, Delaware's body of judge-made law has evolved
considerably in the last century, and has been characterized as an "investment in
legal capital" by corporate law scholar Roberta Romano.2 1 9 While Delaware law
strives to promote many of the same normative goals as the Imperative, including
freedom of contract, 220 Delaware courts recognize the value of contextual analyses
in transactional matters and further note the balancing of interests that is so often
required to resolve disputes. Referring to these tensions, the Court of Chancery
explained, "there are many circumstances in which the high priority our society
places on the enforcement of contracts between private parties gives way to even
221
more important concerns."

question." Id. at 21. The failings of the legal system are summarized as follows: "[h]ad the
norms of market regulation been applicable, these swaps transactions would have been
adequately capitalized by traditional clearing norms; and the dangers building up in these
markets would otherwise have been observable by the transparency and price discipline
that accompanies exchange trading." Id.

218 See sources cited supra notes 211-212.
219 ROMANO, supra note 26, at 40; see also Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 258-75 (1985) (noting the

unique contributions of Delaware courts in the area of corporate law).
220 NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2009) ("Delaware
upholds the freedom of contract and enforces as a matter of fundamental public policy the
voluntary agreements of sophisticated parties.").
221 ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 104 (Del. Ch. 1999).
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Research suggests that rather than causing unpredictable judicial discretion,
expansive analyses in transactional affairs can be a source of certainty.222 Indeed,
the persistent preference for Delaware as a state of incorporation,223 as governing
22
law for sophisticated merger and acquisition agreements,224 and as a forum for
corporate litigation,225 may signal the utility-maximizing potential of more
expansive analyses. This evidence is also theoretically consistent with legal
scholarship asserting that a more reasoned approach often emerges as a dominant
and favored method of resolving disputes that arise in complex commercial
dealings.226
To the extent courts are willing to confront the flaws inherent in the Certainty
Imperative and move beyond its methodological constraints, corporate finance
jurisprudence may ultimately follow a similar course. The following section
explores the hypothesis that more expansive methodologies may be more apt to
enhance efficiency, certainty, and stability in financial markets. This section
elaborates on these recommendations by introducing a case study in which a court
decided a corporate finance controversy pursuant to strict interpretive norms. After
222

Cf sources cited supra note 219.

Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms 'Decisions Where to Incorporate,46
J.L. & EcoN. 383, 391 tbl. 2 (2002); Charles R. T. O'Kelley, Delaware CorporationLaw
and Transaction Cost Engineering, 34 GA. L. REv. 929, 933 (2000) (citing empirical
evidence of this enduring preference).
224 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of CorporateMerger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1982 (2006)
(finding that parties to mergers of acquired public firms prefer Delaware law over that of
all other states).
225 See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New
Formalism, 6 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 40-41 (2009) ("Though it is difficult to obtain precise
numbers, many merger agreements choose Delaware courts as the forum to resolve any
disputes; a choice presumably influenced by the substantial experience that Delaware
courts have with corporate law."); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing
Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 13 (2008) (Delaware is "the preferred
forum for cases involving publicly traded corporations"); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor
Allen's Jurisprudenceand the Theory of Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 704
(1992) (noting the Chancery Court's prominence as a "forum for the adjudication of
corporate law issues").
226 See, e.g., U.C.C § 1-103 (setting forth a foundational principle of the Uniform
Commercial Code (the "Code"): "[The Code] must be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies"); id. § 1-103 official cmt.
1 (further
explaining that courts should apply a contextual interpretive paradigm to cases arising
under the Code); John Braithwaite, Rules andPrinciples:A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 47 (2002) (describing that, as regulated phenomena become
more complex, principles deliver more consistency than rules); Myron T. Steele & J.W.
Verret, Delaware's Guidance: EnsuringEquity for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. &
Bus. REv. 189, 192 (2007) (explaining, in the context of Delaware corporate law, that
while rigid rules can advance predictability in the law, more flexible standards are often
needed to generate more efficient and responsive outcomes).
223
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considering the court's traditional, Imperative-driven decisional approach, this
Article provides a hypothetical consideration of the same case using more
expansive analysis. This exercise demonstrates why it is necessary for modem
courts to move beyond the constraints of the Imperative. It also illustrates
problems that arise when strict interpretive norms are applied to highly complex
arrangements in the modem transactional landscape.
A. Case Study: Beal andIts Discontents
27
A recent corporate finance case, Beal Savings Bank v. Sommer,2
demonstrates the limitations of Imperative-driven judicial decision-making
approaches in identifying the economic substance of claims, particularly where a
dispute involves questions beyond the fact, or extent, of borrower default. In Beal,
the New York Court of Appeals held that an individual lender participating in a
syndicated corporate loan did not have standing to sue a guarantor unilaterally, as
the credit documents "intended for collective action" with respect to the
enforcement of remedies against the borrower or any guarantor.ns
The lending syndicate was, at the time of litigation, comprised of thirty-seven
lenders and an administrative agent, and all but one of the lenders (Beal Savings
Bank) had entered into a forbearance arrangement with the borrower and
guarantors.2 29 In denying Beal Savings Bank's claim to proceed individually
against a guarantor, the court found that a supermajority vote (sufficient to meet
the "required lenders" threshold of lenders holding at least two-thirds of the
outstanding principal balance of the loan) was needed to enforce remedies under
the credit documents.2 30
The court decided the case by applying strict Imperative-driven interpretive
norms. Specifically, the court applied rules of contract interpretation to the
underlying credit documents. Under established principles that are virtually
identical in every jurisdiction, the pivotal question in construing a contract is
whether the terms are clear and unambiguous. 2 3 1 Ambiguity does not exist as a
matter of law merely because the parties offer contradictory interpretations. 23 2

227

8 N.Y.3d 318 (2007). The dispute in Beal pertained to consent mechanisms and

enforcement rights of minority lenders in a syndicated loan agreement: the very issues that
arose in the failed Chrysler debt restructuring negotiations referenced in the introductory

of this Article. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
paragraphs
228
1 d. at 332.
229
Id. at 321-23.
23
oId. at 332.
231 The detection of ambiguity in drafted language can be a matter of varying judicial
opinion and methodology. See generally Jerald D. Stubbs, The Federal Circuit and
Contract Interpretation: May Extrinsic Evidence Ever Be Used to Show Unambiguous
Language Is Ambiguous?, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 785 (2010) (considering the use of extrinsic

evidence in construing contract language).
232 The Second Circuit
wrote:
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Rather, under the "four corners" rule, courts attempt to discern the original intent
of the parties based upon the unequivocal language of their written agreement.233
Courts generally strive to "construe . . . agreements so as to give full meaning and

effect to material provisions."234 Judges typically consider very little extrinsic
evidence when interpreting contract terms, with the exception of occasional
reference to dictionary meanings or, according to the Restatement, the meaning of
technical terms.235 Where there are inconsistent terms in an agreement, all
provisions are reconciled, if possible.23 6 To this end, courts apply ordering rules of
sorts-for instance, specific provisions are enforced over conflicting miscellaneous
*
or otherwise general
provisions. 237
In Beal, no document explicitly prohibited enforcement of remedies by
individual lenders. In fact, the court acknowledged the lack of clarity in the credit
documents: "Here . . . neither the Credit Agreement nor the [keep-well agreement]

contains an explicit provision stating that a Lender may-or may not-take
individual action in the event of default . . . .,,238 Furthermore, the keep-well
agreement, which set forth obligations of the guarantors, provided that it was
"enforceable by . . . each Lender." 239 Also suggesting the availability of individual
lender enforcement, the credit agreement provided, in pertinent part: "No right or
remedy conferred upon the Administrative Agent or the Lenders in this Agreement
is intended to be exclusive" 240 and "every such right and remedy shall be

An "ambiguous" word or phrase is one capable of more than one meaning
when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined
the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the
customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the
particular trade or business.
Walk-In Med. Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1987)
(quoting Eskimo Pie Corp. v. Whitelawn Dairies, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 987, 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
233 See, e.g., United States v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 457, 463 (1950) (construing the
express language of an agreement and declining to consider evidence as to the parties'
subjective intent); Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 538 Madison Realty Co., 807 N.E.2d 876,
879 (N.Y. 2004) ("In the absence of any ambiguity, we look solely to the language used by
the parties to discern the contract's meaning."). But see Richard A. Posner, The Law and
Economics of ContractInterpretation,83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1597 (2005) ("If the contract
is clear, there is no need to interpret it. If it is unclear, the [four corners] rule provides no
guidance to extracting its meaning.").
234 Excess Ins. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 822 N.E.2d
768, 771 (N.Y. 2004).
235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
236

§ 202(3)(b)

(1979).

Nat'l Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg., Corp., 246 N.E.2d 351, 354 (N.Y. 1969).
237 William Higgins & Sons, Inc. v. State, 231 N.E.2d 285,
286 (N.Y. 1967).
238 8 N.Y.3d 318, 326
(2007).
239 Id. at 323.
240 Id. at 322.
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cumulative . . . to every other right or remedy contained in the other Loan
Documents. ..

241

Finally, suggesting that the forbearance arrangement could not proceed
without unanimous consent of the lenders, the keep-well agreement stated: "[N]o
amendment, modification or waiver can be made to the Loan Documents so as to
'release the [guarantors] under the Keep-Well Agreement . . . without the consent
of all Lenders."' 2 42 Furthermore, the guarantors "shall not be released from their
obligations . . . because of . .. [a]ny . .. forbearance . . . or other act or omission of

the Administrative Agent or the Lenders . . . ."243 Thus, the credit documents
appeared to preserve individual enforcement rights, particularly in the event of
forbearance or other material modification of the loan terms.
In contrast, the credit agreement contained language suggesting collective
action pursuant to a supermajority consent mechanism: "the Administrative Agent,
at the direction of the Required Lenders, may 'exercise any or all rights and
remedies at law or in equity,' including the right to recover judgment on the KeepWell [Agreement]." 24 4 Moreover, the keep-well agreement provided that it was a
"Loan Document executed pursuant to the Credit Agreement and shall (unless
otherwise expressly indicated herein) be construed, administered and applied in
accordance with the terms and provisions thereof." 24 5 Thus, the credit documents
appeared to contemplate collective action of some sort, but it was unclear how
such a mechanism should be reconciled with each lender's individual enforcement
rights.
In the spirit of Imperative-driven judicial decision-making, the court
constrained its analysis to strict interpretive norms and applied rules of contract
interpretation to the underlying credit documents, holding that the agreements
unambiguously barred enforcement by individual lenders. 24 6 The court rested its
holding on the rule that "[a] reading of the contract should not render any portion
meaningless."247 In the court's view, recognition of a right of individual
enforcement by each lender would render meaningless the provision authorizing
the agent to act upon the direction of the required lenders. 2 4 8 Furthermore, in
accordance with the rule that "a contract should be 'read as a whole, and every part
. . . interpreted with reference to the whole . . . as to give effect to its general

241 id.

242

1d. at 330.
id.
244
Id. at 322.
245
Id. at 322-23.
243

Id. at 321 ("The specific, unambiguous language of several provisions, read in the
context of the agreements as a whole, convinces us that, in this instance, the lenders
intended to act collectively in the event of the borrower's default and to preclude an
lender from disrupting the scheme of the agreements at issue.").
individual
247
Id. at 324.
246

248 Id.

at 328.
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purpose,"' 24 9 the court concluded that the credit documents as a whole "explicitly
and implicitly" precluded unilateral action by any lender2 50 and suggested an
"unequivocal collective design." 251
Yet the reverse outcome could have been reached by application of the very
same rules of contract interpretation. A court could, for instance, conclude that the
credit documents must not be read so as to render meaningless those portions
asserting that the agent's rights were nonexclusive, and that each lender maintains
an individual right of enforcement. 252 Indeed, absent plain language that "no suit
will be brought unless a majority or supermajority of the lenders agree to take
action," 253 preclusion of a lender's enforcement rights runs contrary to fundamental
principles guiding the relationship between a lender and borrower. As the dissent
succinctly stated: "A bank that lends money to a borrower and is not repaid is
entitled to sue to get its money back." 2 54 In light of the Imperative's promise of
legal certainty, it is ironic that judges experienced in commercial law reach such
opposing interpretations of the credit documents. As the following section
articulates, deeper consideration of Beal reveals additional shortcomings of
Imperative-driven methodologies in resolving controversies that arise in the
modem corporate financing realm.
B. CriticalAnalysis ofBeal

Beal demonstrates that, in cases arising under complex financing
arrangements, present-day economic realities often no longer align with the risks

249

Id. at 324-25 (citing Westmoreland Coal Co. v Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358

(2003)).

2 50

Id. at 324.

251

Id. at 326. The court relied on Credit FrancaisInt'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera

de Comercio, C.A., 490 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct.1985). However, the documents at issue in
Credit Francais contained more explicit and pervasive language vesting rights in the
administrative agent to act on behalf of the lenders collectively, with only one general
provision supporting individual enforcement.
252 For instance, a court could find that each lender maintained traditional
enforcement rights that may be exercised in each lender's individual capacity, and that the
language granting rights to the agent was intended to vest the agent with standing to
proceed solely with respect to the rights of lenders choosing to participate in the collective
action. A similar interpretation was advanced in Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain

Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 1994) ("While the participation agreement ... authorizes
the 'Confirming Bank' to sue 'only if requested to do so by the Majority Banks,' this
provision does not abrogate the rights of participating banks to sue on their own. Indeed,
the agreement points the other way, providing that the rights of the parties 'under the
general law' are expressly reserved.").
253 Beal, 8 N.Y.3d at 332 (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
254

id
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or bargaining power 25 5 present during negotiation of the underlying credit
documents. 25 6 For one thing, by the time litigation is advanced, the facts and
circumstances of a financing arrangement are often far removed from those that
existed when the underlying credit documents were executed. Indeed, at the time
of the court's decision in Beal, the borrower had been insolvent for almost six
years and was undergoing liquidation.257 The dispute among the parties did not
pertain to the borrower's default. However, the fact that circumstances had moved
so far beyond the spirit and scope of the underlying credit documents that the
parties were not even debating the borrower's obligations suggests a profound
disconnect between present-day economic realities and those depicted in the
underlying documents. Yet the court focused exclusively upon these documents in
deciding the case.
In addition, Beal Savings Bank was not a party to the original loan, but rather
acquired its interest. 25 8 This fact highlights a very important reality of the modem
financing realm: lenders buy and sell loan interests on the secondary loan market
with great frequency. 25 9 Furthermore, some speculative investors specifically
acquire distressed debt from other lenders, often for a mere fraction of the
outstanding principal. Although, with proper documentation, such acquirers step
into the shoes of the original lender, these transfers raise questions as to the
propriety of applying rules of contract interpretation that impute the intent and
bargaining power of the original parties to present-day holders. 2 60 For instance, in
Ben-Shahar, supra note 119, at 417 (discussing the importance of relative
bargaining power and its centrality to the advanced arguments).
256 A similar concern has been articulated with respect to bankruptcy
consent
requirements: "Bankruptcy law's reliance on the consent of proxies, successors, or others
similarly situated has become especially problematic in recent years as consent rights
increasingly have been divorced from economic rights through modem financial
engineering." Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy,
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663, 733 (2009).
257 See id. at 323 (noting that the borrower sought bankruptcy protection on
September 11, 2001). Additionally, under virtually all lending agreements, a borrower's
insolvency is a default, terminating the lender's commitment to make any additional
advances of loan proceeds. See, e.g., 1 MORTON MOSKIN, COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS:
STRATEGIES FOR DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING § 16.04(j) (2003) (describing a provision of
this sort in an unsecured credit agreement).
258 Beal, 8 N.Y.3d at 323 ("Neither plaintiff-appellate Beal nor its assignore, BFC
255

Capital, Inc., was an original Lender, and neither held any interest in the loan when the
Borrower petitioned for bankruptcy protection. BFC acquired a 4.5% interest in the bank
debt after the Borrower filed for bankruptcy.")
259 On the secondary loan market, see Peter J. Nigro & Jolo A. C. Santos, Is the
Secondary Loan Market Valuable for Borrowers? 17 (Working Paper, Federal Reserve

Bank of New York, 2007).
260 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 397 (Del. 1996)
("When a contract is ambiguous, a court normally relies upon extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent . . .. [However in this case, s]uch an investigation would reveal information
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the case of an acquisition for a mere fraction of the outstanding principal, there is a
significant incentive for the acquirer to take an adversarial position in restructuring
discussions purely because any concession, settlement or judgment to be obtained
might enable the lender to profit from its investment. 26 1
To be sure, the underlying credit documents are essential in defining the
obligations of the parties, including the extent of the originally outstanding
indebtedness; but conceptually speaking, the financing relationship is an organic
arrangement that evolves over time, much as a corporation grows and evolves.
Indeed, sophisticated corporate financing arrangements often entail revolving lines
of credit and other standing commitments and contractual arrangements,262 and as
such are referred to in the industry as credit "facilities" created pursuant to
underlying credit documents. This nomenclature, which is to some degree
analogous to the distinction between a corporation and its formation documents, is
perhaps a subtle recognition of the dynamic nature of the relationships created by
credit documents. Furthermore, as financing arrangements have grown to include
heterogeneous lender groups, and as securitization and derivative transactions have
created additional layers to existing arrangements, the Imperative's goal-the
promotion of certainty and uniformity premised upon the imputed expectations of
financial institutions-has become nearly impossible to meet.

about the thoughts and positions of, at most, the issuer and the underwriter [rather than the
current debt holders.]"):
261 A problem of this sort also arises in the bankruptcy
context. For instance, U.S.
Bankruptcy Judge Robert Gerber, at a hearing on the issue of reforming Bankruptcy Rule
2019 (which mandates disclosure of certain creditors' economic interests in claims),
purportedly recounted a situation in the General Motors Corp. bankruptcy, whereby "a
group told him it represented 1,500 bondholders who bought their debt at around par using
pension money. When he requested disclosure under rule 2019 he learned the group
consisted of three people who bought their debt at pennies on the dollar." Tiffany Kary,
FederalJudge Says Rules Needed to Bar Bankruptcy FailureBets, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 05,
2010),
http://www.bloomberg.cojp/apps/news?pid=90970900&sid=apaU32ZSweGY.
Judge Gerber also noted that "distressed investors 'have their own agendas, which not
infrequently consist of simply maximizing returns for themselves, in the shortest possible
time horizon."' Id.
262 See, e.g., O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. successfully completes debt refinancing,
AFTERMARKET Bus. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://aftermarketbusiness.search-autoparts.com/
aftermarketbusiness/Distribution/OReilly-Automotive-Inc-successfully-completes-debt/
ArticleStandard/Article/detail/703975 (reporting the closing of a $750 million credit
facility, including a $200 million facility for letters of credit and a $75 million swing-line
facility); Parkway Closes New Revolving Credit Facility, PRNEWSWIRE (Jan. 31, 2011),
http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/parkway-closes-new-revolving-credit-facility114979914.html (reporting the closing of a $200 million credit facility, including a $190
million unsecured revolving line of credit and a $10 million working capital revolving line
of credit, pursuant to which the borrower also maintains a $100 million interest rate swap).
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C. ConfrontingAmbiguity in Beal
Ironically, while the Beal court's Imperative-driven approach has been met
with considerable criticism from within the corporate finance practice
263
most observers conclude that the court ultimately assigned legal
community,
2 64
rights and remedies in a manner that is consistent with industry expectations.
Based solely upon the outcome of the case, strong arguments can be made that the
court sought to advance equitable interests or confirm standard practices in the
industry. Yet the opinion does not reveal consideration of these factors. 2 65 Rather,
the decision evidences only a struggle to declare highly incongruous documents
"unambiguous as a matter of law" by operation of some of the most nebulous rules
of contract interpretation.2 66 For this reason, the trouble with Beal lies not in the
See sources cited infra note 264.
See, e.g., Paul J. Epstein, Beal v. Sommer: Did Decision on Collective Action in
Exercise of Lenders' Remedies Reflect Contracting Parties' Intent?, 125 BANKING L.J.
240, 240-41, 246-47 (2008) ("As a matter of equity, the Court's decision ... seems to be
263
264

the correct one.

. .

. [H]owever, the Court seems to have cut some corners as a matter of

contract interpretation.

. .

. [The conclusion of the contract interpretation analysis] is not

clearly supported by the terms of the contracts themselves . . . ."); Joshua Stein, Model

Intercreditor Agreement (Among A Lenders, B Lenders, and Swap Counterparty), in
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FIN.
MATURITIES, AND STACKS OF DEBT

2010:

HOW

TO

HANDLE

DEFAULTS,

DISTRESS,

445 (PLI Real Estate Law and Practice Course
2010) ("The result in Beal conformed to industry
23198,
Order
No.
Handbook Series, PLI
expectations, as the author understands them. Given some of the language in the Beal loan
documents, though, the court perhaps did the lending industry a favor to some degree.");
Keith H. Wofford, Lender 'Collective Action' Doctrine Provokes Controversy; Against: A
Violation of New York Law and Good Policy, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 2009, at 9 col. 5 ("The
Beal Court took the position that, even where a credit agreement accords rights to
individual lenders or provides that certain acts require unanimous lender consent, those
provisions should be read narrowly (even to the point of having no meaning), in order that
the collective design of the credit agreement may prevail.").
265 Although the majority opinion includes several citations to a single secondary
source, written nearly twenty years earlier, such review can hardly be considered a
thorough investigation of customary practice. Beal Say. Bank v. Sommer, 8 N.Y.3d 320,
330-32 (2007).
266 In general, courts presiding over corporate finance controversies are reluctant to
identify ambiguity, presumably because any such declaration would require a more
expansive interpretative analysis and therefore potentially run afoul of the Imperative. See,
e.g., In re QuVIS, Inc., No. 09-10706, 2010 WL 2228246, at *6 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 1,
2010) ("[The loan agreement was] less than precise in its treatment of the secured creditors
and their rights vis-a-vis one another, [but nonetheless unambiguous as a matter of law on
this very issue.]"). In a rare example of a court finding that a material provision of a
corporate financing agreement is ambiguous, a United States District Court found a
material adverse change clause to be ambiguous, thereby prompting a review of extrinsic
evidence as well as an analysis of the foreseeability of adverse events. Capitol Justice LLC
v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 706 F. Supp. 2d 23, 30-29 (D.D.C. 2009); see also BKCAP, LLC
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decisional outcome, but in the fact that the ruling purports to be based upon textual
analysis and is arguably divorced from the construction of the text itself.
Indeed, as the dissent argues, the majority in Beal reaches a "pragmatically
appealing result," given that only one of the thirty-seven lenders sought to enforce
remedies.267 However, this result was achieved by "read[ing] into the loan
documents language that would compel results far less appealing."26 Moreover,
the holding is inconsistent with prior decisions, which held that similar language
granting enforcement rights to administrative agents does not override express
rights of lenders to proceed individually. 26 9
Ultimately, as Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Davis warns, this
murky judicial analysis injects substantial legal uncertainty. 270 Whereas strict
interpretive norms may seem, at least theoretically, to advance the Imperative's
laissez faire ideals, they might in fact permit one of the most disquieting forms of
governmental intervention in finance and lending-unbridled judicial discretion. In
essence, seemingly mechanical rules of contract interpretation, when applied to
exceedingly complex commercial agreements, may serve only to conceal a highly
subjective judicial decision-making process.
For instance, as evidenced by decisions outside of the corporate finance
realm, the prevailing textualist approach to contract interpretation enables judges
to act upon a number of subjective influences and biases, 2 7 1 and also invites
v. Captec Franchise Trust 2000-1, 572 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding a commercial
loan agreement ambiguous as a matter of law, and remanding the case for a trial to
determine the parties' intent).
267 Beal, 8 N.Y.3d at
336.
268 Id. at 335-36 (Smith, J., dissenting).
269 See supra note 252. Commentators have attempted
to summarize the import of
Beal: "New York law further provides that the typical credit agreement language that
authorizes the administrative agent, acting upon the instructions of lenders holding a
certain percentage of the debt, to declare the loan accelerated and pursue remedies against
the borrower in the event of default, precludes individual creditor action." Eric M. Rosof et
al., Distressed Mergers andAcquisitions, in LEVERAGED FIN. 2010, at 394 (PLI Corporate
Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order No. 23348, 2010) (emphasis added).
Yet the court ruled in part based upon specific clauses, and in part based upon a summary
view of the entire set of documents; thus, without public access to the agreements, it is
impossible to know whether the ruling was based upon "typical credit agreement
language."
270 See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 375-76 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); supra note 204 and accompanying text.
271 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008) (exploring the
behavioral, attitudinal and political pressures that influence judicial decision-making);
Lawrence Solan, Terni Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract
Interpretation,108 COLUM. L. REv. 1268, 1268-69 (2008) (discussing cognitive biases in
construing contractual language); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J.
Wistrich, Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) (discussing cognitive
biases among federal judges).
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inconsistent 2 72 and inadequate analyses. 2 7 3 Moreover, given the sheer size,
complexity and, at times, internal inconsistencies of the agreements and
274
robust contract
instruments that govern modern commercial transactions,
2 75
it is
Consequently,
cumbersome.
increasingly
interpretation has become
27 6
against
levied
vulnerable to oversight and error. Yet among the many criticisms
strict interpretive norms, the strongest of all such attacks assert that the rules of
contract interpretation are mere facades, concealing decisions that are actually
277
The
rooted in undeclared normative or theoretical persuasions of the court.
realm of corporate finance is no exception to these criticisms; Beal exemplifies
these very concerns.
Much of the criticism of Beal stems from the court's insistence that seemingly
internally inconsistent documents are unambiguous.2 78 By declaring the credit
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
("[Tihere are two opposing canons on almost every point."); see also Avery Wiener Katz,
The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 497 (2004) ("[M]any rules of contract law have the effect of privileging or
emphasizing certain types of potentially relevant interpretive materials, and discounting or
excluding others.").
273 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 85 (2005) ("[O]veremphasis on text can lead courts astray, divorcing law
from life .... ).
274 Credit documents often comprise hundreds or even thousands of pages. A
significant portion is negotiated via a flurry of drafts on the eve of closing. These realities
of modem practice can lead to the problems articulated in a recent case construing
indenture documents. Bank of New York v. FirstMillennium, Inc. notes that courts ought to
"construe a contract 'in accord with the parties' intent,' and [that] the best evidence of their
intent 'is what they say in their writing.' Easy enough to say: but difficult to apply when
the parties' writings are as convoluted and opaque as those in this case." 598 F. Supp. 2d
550, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170
(2002)); see also HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Dara Petroleum, Inc., No. CIV. 2:09-2356,
2010 WL 2197525, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2010) ("[T]he phrase 'the 30 Day LIBOR
272

equivalent to the Wall Street Journal Prime,' is unintelligible on its face . . . . Neither

defendants' expert, who has worked extensively in the lending industry, nor plaintiffs
expert, a professor of economics, had ever seen the specific phrase . . . .").
275 See, e.g., In re Premier Entm't Biloxi LLC, 445 B.R. 582 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2010)
(providing a thorough interpretation of indenture agreements, resulting in a published
opinion of sixty pages).
276 See, e.g., Randall H. Warner, All Mixed up About Contract: When Is Contract
Interpretationa Legal Question and When Is It a Fact Question?, 5 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 81
(2010) (describing inconsistencies in the treatment of contract interpretation as a question
of fact or of law).
277 FRANK C. NEWMAN & STANLEY S. SURREY, LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
654 (1955) ("[Canons of construction] are useful only as facades, which for an occasional
judge may add luster to an argument persuasive for other reasons.").
278 See sources cited supra
note 265.
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documents unambiguous as a matter of law, the court ostensibly avoided expansive
interpretive analyses and remained focused upon the plain meaning of underlying
documents in its quest to assign legal rights and obligations. Beal is not an outlier
case, either in terms of its methodology or the questions presented. Even within the
bankruptcy context, where courts routinely exercise broad legal and equitable
powers, courts continue to restrict their analyses to strict interpretive norms when
construing the rights and obligations of parties to existing financing
arrangements.27 9
Had the Beal court acknowledged ambiguity in the underlying credit
documents, it might have reached an outcome that assigned legal rights and
obligations identically to the actual outcome, but it would have been forced to
engage in more rigorous interpretive analysis 280 or, more boldly, advance a theory
of collective action grounded in law or equity.
Generally, a court confronted with an ambiguous agreement is expected to
discern the intent of the original parties to the underlying documents. 2 8 1 These
analyses are premised upon the assumption that the parties addressed all pertinent
issues during negotiations, but did not articulate the resolution in their written

Generally speaking, bankruptcy courts look to state contract law when matters
arise under private agreements and there is no statutory law (such as provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code) on point. See HSBC Bank USA v. Branch 364 F.3d 355, 363 (1st Cir.
2004). As a result, decision-making norms, such as those that have evolved under the
Certainty Imperative, continue to reign supreme. For instance, consent conflicts arise with
respect to free and clear sales, which are conducted under § 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code,
and credit bids, which are conducted under § 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In
re GWLS Holdings, Inc., No. 08-12430, 2009 WL 453110 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23, 2009)
(applying prevailing methods of contract interpretation to underlying credit documents to
determine consent thresholds and other requisite rights and obligations of the parties before
the estate may proceed with the sale); In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 671 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009). For example, in Chrysler, lenders holding less than 1% of the outstanding
prepetition indebtedness objected to a proposed sale, arguing that unanimous consent was
required. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 103 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 576 F.3d
108 (2d Cir. 2009). As in Beal, the Chrysler court decided the case based upon rules of
contract interpretation, finding that the underlying credit documents unambiguously
evidenced a collective design, and that the requisite consent threshold was satisfied. Id. at
102-04.
280 The methodologies described herein are based upon the approaches presented in
Posner, supra note 233, at 1589-90. See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs.
Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for
Interpretation,96 Ky. L.J. 43 (2008) (discussing additional methodologies courts use in
contract interpretation).
281 See generally Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol
Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965) (a foundational work exploring the process of
construing ambiguous texts).
279
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282

If evidence
agreements. If necessary, a court may look to extrinsic evidence.
does not reveal the actual intent of the original parties, or if evidence reveals that
the parties never addressed the issue during negotiations, the court might attempt
to determine what the parties would have agreed had the question arisen during
negotiations. This is, in fact, the most widely employed approach to gap-filling
incomplete commercial contracts.283 To discern this so-called hypothetical
284
a court might look to surrounding circumstances at the time the
intent,
285
agreement was executed, customary usage of language in the agreement, or even
terms that the marketplace would dictate for deals similar in scope.286
In other cases, ambiguities may be resolved pursuant to a tiebreaker rule.
Perhaps the most frequently cited example of such a rule, contra proferentem,
provides that ambiguous language should be interpreted against the drafting
party.287 Courts often apply this rule in the context of insurance agreements,288 but
it has been exported to the financing realm. 28 9 In the area of finance and lending,
See PNC Bank v. GPL Outlots, LP, No. 1:09-cv-1415, 2010 WL 2696344 (S.D.
Ind. July 1, 2010) (permitting discovery of the drafting history of an allegedly ambiguous
Master Loan Agreement).
283 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 119, at 396 ("The most broadly accepted principle of
gap filling is that courts should 'mimic the parties' will.").
284 Posner, supra note 233, at 1590.
285 Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 612 F. Supp. 351, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (recommending review of evidence relating to customary practice in the Eurodollar
market).
286 This approach was taken in the commercial gap-filling case, Oglebay Norton Co.
v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515, 519-20 (Ohio 1990) (supplanting contract price terms with
market prices).
287 The Restatement suggests that construing a contract against the drafter is justified
when the drafter is in a better position to predict uncertainties or when the drafting party
has the stronger bargaining position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a
(1981).
288 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 729 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) ("When an ambiguity is found [in an insurance policy], it must be construed
against the insurer and in favor of coverage."). For a discussion of the rule's history, see
generally Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1105 (2006).
289 Nat'l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat'l Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 59 (5th Cir. 1975)
(construing ambiguity in a security agreement against the bank as drafter); In re Las Torres
Development, L.L.C., 408 B.R. 876, 885 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (construing ambiguity in
a collateral assignment agreement against the drafter); Priority Healthcare Corp. v.
Chaudhuri, No. 6:30-cv-425, 2008 WL 2477623, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2008) ("As the
Credit Agreement is a pre-printed form of Priority Healthcare, this ambiguity must be
construed against Priority Healthcare."); Novogroder/San Bernardino, L.L.C. v. Cohen
Realty Servs., Inc., No. 98 C 7484, 2000 WL 556621, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2000)
(quoting Newman & Schwartz v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 102 F.3d 660, 663 (2d Cir.
1996)) ("Pursuant to New York Law, 'under the principle of contraproferentum, courts are
to construe ambiguous contract terms against the drafter."').
282
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another tiebreaker rule has been adopted in some states, whereby guaranty
agreements are strictly construed in favor of the guarantor.2 90 There is wide
variation in how, when, and to what extent such tiebreaker rules are applied. For
instance, some courts seek to avoid application of contra proferentem by
determining whether only one of multiple alternative interpretations is
reasonable. 291 In these cases, courts test reasonableness based upon an analysis of
hypothetical intent at the time the contract was entered into,292 or based upon the
overall utility maximization of each proffered interpretation.29 3 Other courts have
limited application of this rule by applying it only where actual intent of the parties
cannot be determined upon review of extrinsic evidence. 29 4

"A guarantor is entitled to have his agreement strictly construed so that it is limited
to his undertakings, and it will not be extended by construction or implication," and thus a
290

court should adopt "a construction which is most favorable to the guarantor." Coker v.
Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 n.1 (Tex. 1983) (citing Reece v. First State Bank of Denton,
566 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1978); see also Mazur v. Young, 507 F.3d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir.
2007) ("[C]ourts should 'apply the principle of strict interpretation to the construction of [a
guaranty] contract."' (citing Bandit Indus. Inc. v. Hobbs Int'l, Inc., 620 N.W.2d 531, 535
(Mich. 2001))); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. MPC Investors, LLC, 705 F. Supp. 2d 728, 736
(E.D. Mich. 2010) (explaining that Michigan precedent narrowly construes guaranty
contracts); Ulreich v. Kreutz, 876 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that under
Missouri law "liability of a guarantor is to be strictly construed" according to the plain
meaning of the agreement).
291 Lohnes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 61 (1st Cir. 2001) (referring, in
an equity financing case, to the rule of contra proferentum as a "hoary aphorism" and
noting that the appellant's "reliance is mislaid. In order to invoke this principle, the
proponent first must . . . show that the interpretation which he urges is, 'under all the

circumstances, a reasonable and practical one."'); Cappellini v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 991 F.
Supp. 31, 39-40 (D. Mass. 1997) (declining to apply contra proferentum because the
alternative interpretation was unreasonable):
292 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. BFA Ltd. P'ship, 948 A.2d 318, 328 (Conn. 2008)
(explaining that under one interpretation, "the plaintiff would have decreased its protection
while ... loaning the defendants up to an additional $2 million and extending the maturity
date of the loan.... We cannot reasonably conclude that the plaintiff would have lessened
its indemnification protection in this situation.").
293 See Savedoff v. Access Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 764-68 (6th Cir. 2008)
(considering application of such a rule to a student loan agreement, but finding that it was
not reasonable for the court to read the contract to prohibit collection of additional interest
from monthly payments).
294 Ursery v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 271560, 2007 WL 2192657, at *8 n.20
(Mich. Ct. App. July 31, 2007) ("contraproferentum ... is used only when there is a true
ambiguity and the parties' intent cannot be discerned through all conventional means,
including extrinsic evidence."); Stephenson v. Third Co., No. M2002-02082-COA-R3-CV,
2004 WL 383317, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004) (holding that contraproferentum
"does not trump other rules of construction in all situations. Above all, it does not negate
the actual intention of the parties, where that can be deduced from other evidence").
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As a final alternative, courts at times apply economic analysis to aid in
discerning whether one interpretation of an ambiguous agreement is more
reasonable. 29 5 Economic analysis is particularly useful in this context given the
similarities between the process of balancing conflicting contract interpretations
and cost-benefit analysis-an approach rooted in principles of economic
efficiency. For the most part, these analyses look to the economic utilities as they
existed at the time the contract was negotiated.296 To the extent only one
interpretation would clearly advance overall utility, or conversely, to the extent one
interpretation would yield an economically perverse outcome, the more efficient
approach is adopted.297
Yet even these more expansive rules of interpretation may be inadequate in
the corporate finance context. For one thing, these rules tend to focus the court's
attention upon underlying agreements that do not reveal the intent of parties who
bear the present-day economic benefit or burden of any particular outcome. For
instance, rules of contract interpretation place considerable attention upon the
intent, interests, and bargaining power of the drafting and negotiating parties. 29 8
However, in a case like Beal that pertains to a syndicated credit facility, the lead
drafter was likely the administrative agent who may have very little economic
interest in the outcome of the litigation. 2 99 Indeed, in order to most effectively
resolve the controversy among the parties and to generate useful precedent that
provides certainty to the corporate finance community, a case like Beal probably
requires that which the Certainty Imperative has effectively barred: a judicial
decision grounded upon reasoned legal or equitable doctrine.
As Beal evidences, in the continued absence of doctrinal law governing the
rights and obligations of parties to corporate financing arrangements, market
295

See Posner, supra note 233, at 1590.

See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d
587, 591 (Tex. 1996) ("we are to examine all parts of the contract and the circumstances
surrounding the formulation of the contract. . .. It is inconceivable that the parties intended
such a perverse result in this contract.").
297 See Fresh Del Monte Produce N.V. v. Eastbrook Caribe A.V.V., 836 N.Y.S.2d
160, 164-65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (contracts should not be interpreted so as to produce
unreasonable results).
298 The Kaiser Aluminum court acknowledged this limitation of rules of contract
interpretation, observing that debt holders, while parties to the underlying contracts, were
not engaged in the negotiation and drafting process. Intimating that the issuer, as drafter,
had greater power in the negotiation and drafting process, the court applied a tiebreaker
rule and construed the contract against the issuer. See supra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text.
299 By definition, the Administrative Agent is the lead arranger, not a lender. While in
practice most lead arrangers serve in a dual capacity, also holding some fractional interest
as a lender, there is wide variation and, furthermore, the loan interest might have been sold
or reduced through the secondary market. See Nada Mora, Lender Exposure and Effort in
the Syndicated Loan Market (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City Research, Working Paper
No. 10-12, 2010).
296
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participants are left grappling with a court's contract interpretation exercisewondering whether some other guiding principle, such as equity, efficiency, or
customary practice, motivated the court. Furthermore, these methodologies can
lead to decisions that are divorced from underlying economic substance. For
instance, in a 2009 ruling, a United States Bankruptcy Court found that even where
a majority of note holders consented to a credit bid, the sale could not proceed
because the underlying credit documents vested in the indenture trustee the sole
discretion to take substantive action.300 Given that indenture trustees do not bear
the risk of economic loss with respect to a financing arrangement, the outcome
perversely vested substantive rights in a manner that not only does not align with
present-day economic interests, but also thwarts present-day economic interests.30'
Perhaps in recognition of these limitations, the efficacy of deciding complex
disputes based on rules of contract interpretation is generally under pressure.302
These criticisms echo deeper normative questions as to the relative efficiencies of
judge-made doctrine versus bright-line rules, 30 3 and further call into question the
utility of Imperative-driven methodologies in promoting certainty and stability in
financial markets. Indeed, if the Certainty Imperative-as the bedrock goal of
corporate finance jurisprudence-reflects a genuine desire on the part of the
judiciary to promote certainty and stability in financial markets, then continued
reliance on strict interpretive norms may bring about a crisis of legitimacy with
respect to the court's very role as an arbiter of disputes.

300

In re Electroglas, Inc., No. 09-12416(PJW), 2009 WL 8503455 (Bankr. D. Del.

Sept. 23, 2009).
30' Recent analyses demonstrate agency problems, including moral hazards, that arise

when a lead arranger does not share in the outstanding indebtedness. These observations
can be analogized to the indenture trustee scenario, particularly in a situation of borrower
insolvency where the lead arranger's principal goal of maintaining a customer relationship
is likely to be moot. See Mora, supra note 299, at 5.
302 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and JudicialPreferences,45

VAND.

L.

REV.

647, 656 (1992) (predicting that societal utility

would increase if judges decided cases with guidance from principles of public policy
rather than purely on the basis of plain meaning); see also David McLauchlan, Contract
Interpretation: What Is It About?, 31

SYDNEY

L. REv. 5, 18 (2009) (arguing that the

consideration of extrinsic evidence is in fact consistent with the principles behind the plain
meaning approach); Posner, supra note 233, at 1587 (exploring the inherent inefficiencies
of mechanical rules of contract interpretation).
303 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT
OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 121-23 (1973)

(articulating benefits of a common law system versus a civil law code).
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V. EXPLORING ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL METHODOLOGIES

A. Key Modifications to PrevailingImperative-Driven Methodologies

This section proposes several recommendations to expand the scope of
judicial inquiries in lending and finance jurisprudence. In particular, I propose two
modifications to prevailing Imperative-driven interpretive methodologies. First,
courts should consider the present-day economic substance of each party's claims.
Second, courts should be empowered to allocate legal rights and remedies in a
manner that is consistent with the actual economic arrangement of the parties.
These modifications would allow courts to more closely replicate the outcomes
that the parties would have reached but for the inefficiencies and sub-optimal
allocations introduced when contractual terms are applied to present-day economic
realities. Further development and evaluation of these recommendations is needed,
particularly from an interdisciplinary perspective. In the meantime, the suggestions
below strive to counter the tendency for Imperative-driven methodologies to
promote form over substance when applied to complex and dynamic financing
arrangements.
1. ConsiderationofPresent-DayEconomic Substance

Courts striving to reach efficient decisions in the financing realm must be
empowered to consider the present-day economic substance of each party's claims
by determining, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, the nature and extent of
each party's actual economic interest at the time of litigation. Consideration of
present-day economic substance would essentially involve a factual inquiry,
pursuant to a request for disclosure by the parties to a controversy. Specifically,
each claimant would be required to file a verified statement with the court, setting
forth three elements: (1) the identity of the lender, creditor, or claimant; (2) the
nature and amount of this person's interest in the financing arrangement, the dates
when acquired and the amounts paid therefor, unless the claim or interest is alleged
to have been acquired pursuant to this person's original participation in the
financing arrangement as set forth in the credit documents; 304 and (3) the nature
and amount of this person's actual or prospective losses as a result of any
deterioration in the financing arrangement. 305 These disclosure obligations should
304 The proposed disclosure requirements set forth in clauses (1) and (2) are a
modified version of the language in Bankruptcy Rule 2019, which is intended to foster
transparency in the bankruptcy process. See In re Nw. Airlines Corp., et al., 363 B.R. 701,
701-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
305 Essentially, this is a test of economic substance, albeit exploring loss potential as
opposed to the profit potential that is more frequently examined in tax law. See David P.
Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle ofEconomic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 235-36 (1999)
("A transaction only has economic substance . . . if it alters the taxpayer's economic
position in a meaningful way (apart from its tax consequences).").
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be applied to each lender represented by an administrative agent, indenture trustee,
or other agent serving with respect to a syndicated or participated lending
arrangement. 30 6 A disclosure requirement of this sort would enable courts to
identify the true economic substance of each underlying claim, in what would
essentially involve a "substance over form" investigation. 307 In most cases, these
interests will be radically different from those that existed when the credit
documents were executed; particularly to the extent interests have been sold on the
secondary market.308
Additionally, courts should be empowered to qualitatively assess each
person's claims in a "facts and circumstances" inquiry intended to identify possible
rent-seeking motivations. The importance of this inquiry is supported by economic
efficiency principles. Indeed, since negotiations often enable parties to avoid
litigation, the disputes that advance to litigation (excluding enforcement actions for
monetary defaults) are likely to involve situations where present-day economic
substance is far removed from contractual language. In this circumstance, parties
have highly asymmetric risks and are therefore encouraged to engage in rent
seeking 3s to benefit from the disparities between actual economic interests and
In this respect, the proposed analytical framework materially departs from
Bankruptcy Rule 2019, which was recently amended to clarify that disclosure obligations
did not apply to creditors who are otherwise represented by an administrative agent,
indenture trustee, or similar covered entity. See Order of the Supreme Court, Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (2011), available at http://www.supreme
court.gov/orders/courtorders/frbk I .pdf (authorizing certain amendments to the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including Rule 2019, which such amendments shall take
effect on December 1, 2011).
307 The substance over form doctrine figures prominently in tax law. See, e.g.,
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
30s For example, in Beal, lenders holding approximately 95% of the outstanding
indebtedness consented to the forbearance arrangement. At first blush, this suggests that the
advancement of Beal Savings Bank's interests at the expense of the remaining lenders
carries a price: an amount equal to the present-day value of a forbearance arrangement
sufficient to gain the support of lenders who have an economic interest equal to
approximately 95% of the outstanding indebtedness. This assumption clearly renders
decisional outcomes that advance the interest of such lenders more "pragmatically
appealing," as the dissent notes. 8 N.Y.3d 320, 335-36 (N.Y. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting).
Yet suppose disclosures to the court revealed that Beal Savings Bank was the only original
lender, and that the holders of the remaining 95% had acquired their interests for mere
pennies on the dollar. In such a case, the party with the greatest actual economic interest
and greatest relative incurred or prospective losses would be Beal Savings Bank, and an
argument can be made that its interests ought to be advanced to the greatest extent by the
decisional outcome.
309 Rent-seeking is any conduct intended to extract economic benefit by some method
other than the adding of value to an enterprise. See generally James M. Buchanan, Rent
Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3-4
(James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
306
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contractual rights. 3 10 In the context of a deteriorating financing arrangement, where
resources are scarce, this behavior represents a particularly egregious form of
waste. Rent-seeking parties siphon resources for personal profit, thereby further
compounding the loss.
2. Considerationof the "EconomicEffect" of ContractualAssignment of Rights
and Remedies

Courts should be empowered to engage in distributive and allocative
functions that replicate the outcomes the parties would have reached but for the
inefficiencies and sub-optimal allocations introduced when strict contractual terms
are applied to present-day economic substance. Courts may continue to apply rules
of contract interpretation to understand the relationships, rights, and obligations
established pursuant to the underlying credit documents; however, before assigning
legal rights and remedies or economic surplus in accordance with contractual
language, these assignments should be tested for "economic effect."3 1'
For an allocation of legal rights, remedies, or economic surplus set forth in the
underlying credit documents to have economic effect, it must be consistent with
the relative economic benefits and burdens borne by each party.312 For example,
where underlying credit documents vest substantive rights in a party that bears no
present-day economic interest in the financing arrangement, and parties with
substantial present-day economic interests wish to proceed in a contrary manner, a
court would be empowered to reallocate substantive rights accordingly, such that
the substantive rights are exercised in a manner that has economic effect.
Similarly, any economic surplus would be distributed in accordance with the actual
economic interests of parties as disclosed to the court. In essence, an allocative
model would remove incentives for rent-seeking behaviors and other forms of
waste, thereby distributing scarce resources in accordance with economic
substance.
At first blush, application of allocative models in the financing realm may
raise concerns of excessive meddling. However, an approach of this sort may in
fact serve as a better analogue to the analyses applied from within financial
markets. For instance, when parties to corporate financing disputes restructure
distressed debts outside of court, the process is not one of strict enforcement or
310

See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 58-

63 (1977) (exploring asymmetries resulting from inefficient laws); William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61-62 (1971); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedureand JudicialAdministration, 2 J. LEG. STUD.

399, 399-400 (1973).
311 The "economic effect" test is used to determine the proper allocation of
partnership items that impact the federal income taxation of partners. See 26 U.S.C. §
704(b) (2006).
312 A more detailed description of the economic effect test as applied in the context of
partnership allocations can be found in Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a) (1960).
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rearticulation of each party's imputed expectations in negotiating the credit
documents.3 13 Rather, the process is one of allocating resources in accordance with
the present-day economic substance of each party's claims.3 14 In particular, parties
strive to maximize the borrower's assets or income realization potential so that
wealth can be transferred in an orderly manner to lenders in an effort to achieve the
greatest satisfaction of outstanding obligations.1 To the extent any additional
surplus can be made available, whether in the form of assets that can be sold or
cash that can be freed by reducing expenses, the loan is restructured to allow this
realization. 3 16 If, in contrast, lenders resolved disputes pursuant to strict contract
enforcement, then commercial loans would virtually always end in judicial or nonjudicial enforcement of remedies (such as foreclosure) rather than consensual

workouts. 3 17
Indeed, allocative approaches are already used within the bankruptcy context
with respect to matters arising beyond the scope of credit documents.3 18 Yet within
or without bankruptcy court, prevailing Imperative-driven methodologies largely
reject any such distributive or allocative models in the finance and lending context.
The following section explores how a hypothetical court reconsidering Beal might
incorporate these and related analytical constructs into an interpretive methodology
that better advances the underlying goals of the Certainty Imperative.

313 See David Brown et al., Theory and Evidence on the Resolution of Financial
Distress, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 1357, 1393-94 (2006).
314

d

For modeling of utility maximizing behavior by and among lenders, borrowers,
and regulators in the course of loan workouts, see Philippe Aghion et al., On the Design of
315

Bank Bailout Policy in Transition Economics, in

DESIGNING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 7-

36 (Anna Meyendorff & Anjan V. Thakor eds., 2002). Although the model applies
specifically to transition economies, it draws upon certain universal tendencies that are
relevant in virtually all jurisdictions. For instance, the model reminds us that banks have an
incentive to restructure in order to avoid having nonperforming loans in their loan
portfolios.
316 "Sound workout programs begin with a complete understanding of all relevant
information, as well as a realistic evaluation of the abilities of both the borrower and bank
management." OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE AND CONSTRUCTION LENDING 21 (1998).
3
Jun Chen & Yongheng Deng, Commercial Mortgage Workout Strategy and
ConditionalDefault Probability:Evidencefrom Special-Serviced CMBS Loans 1-7 (Univ.
of S. Cal. Lusk Ctr. for Real Estate, Working Paper 2010) (reporting that, out of 217
commercial loans for which consensual workouts were attempted, approximately half
resulted in a modification that continued the lending relationship, while only 22% required
the lender's legal enforcement of remedies).
318 See Jon Minear, Comment, Your Licensor Has a License to Kill, and It May Be
Yours: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Resist Bankruptcy Law that Threatens Intellectual
PropertyLicensingRights, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 107, 114-18 (2007).
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B. Beal Revisited under a More Expansive InterpretiveMethodology

A hypothetical court, recognizing that the underlying credit documents are
ambiguous with respect to the consent threshold required to bar lenders from
proceeding individually, might turn to a more expansive paradigm to reach an
economically efficient outcome. Alternatively, to the extent the agreements are
found to be unambiguous as a matter of law, a court might proceed to a more
expansive analysis where these agreements allocate legal rights, remedies, or
economic surplus in a manner that lacks economic effect in the context of the
dispute.
Upon identifying the present-day economic substance of each party's claims,
pursuant to disclosures submitted to the court and a facts and circumstances
inquiry, a hypothetical court would proceed to identify the potential utilitymaximization of each alternative outcome. To this end, the court might evaluate
theoretical and empirical insights with respect to various consent mechanisms.319
For instance, scholarly material analyzing sovereign bond restructurings in the
1990s and early 2000s would be particularly relevant. 32 0 Work produced in this
area generally reveals that, setting aside transaction costs, collective action in
multi-lender arrangements allows for more efficient renegotiation and restructuring
of a borrower's obligations. In contrast, without any sort of collective action
mechanism, each lender would be required to proceed individually to enforce
remedies, thereby draining the borrower's assets due to the costs and delays
associated with defending each suit. However, where a collective action
mechanism employs a threshold that is easily satisfied, a moral hazard arises
whereby the borrower has incentives to seek restructuring of debts that it might
have otherwise satisfied according to original credit terms.3 2 1
In comparing the utility maximizing potential of unanimous versus
supermajority consent mechanisms, literature identifies three broad problems
associated with unanimous consent mechanisms in the debt-restructuring context;

A rich discussion of consent mechanisms, as well as the particular costs and
benefits of each, can be found in classic political economy texts. The most noted example
319

is JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
320 See Sbnke Hiiseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond
Contracts-Whence the Opposition?, in ISSUES IN FINANCE: CREDIT, CRISES AND POLICIES
(Stuart Sayer ed., 2010). See generally Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds
and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody,
Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 7458 2000); Jonathan Sedlak, Comment, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring:Statutory Reform or ContractualSolution?, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1483 (2004).
321 Moral hazard risks are explored in the context of sovereign debt restructuring in
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 956 (2000).
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the circumstances in Beal present an opportunity for the same problems to arise.32 2
First, there can be substantial transaction costs because lenders holding a small
fractional interest must be reached, informed of the proposed restructuring, and
given an opportunity to respond.323 Second, in light of the heterogeneity of lender
groups,324 it can be very difficult for any one restructuring arrangement to suit the
needs of every lender; ironically, the arrangement that would advance the interests
of every lender would most likely not generate relief to a distressed borrower. 32 5
Furthermore, when examined in light of Coasian economic theory,326
unanimous consent mechanisms invite rent-seeking behavior. 3 2 7 In particular, there
are obvious incentives for holdout by minority lenders, because a single fractional
owner is in a position to demand benefits in exchange for consent. These payoffs
occur in the financing realm; for instance, the discovery of payments in exchange
for minority lender consent was the subject of a 2010 case before the Fifth
Circuit. 32 8 As other lenders become aware of these arrangements, a classic
prisoners' dilemma results, whereby the tendency to hold out creates an
equilibrium that leaves all parties in a worse position. 32 9

322

The three problems described herein are modified from Hdseler, supra note 320, at

91-92.

323

See id.
Syndicated financing arrangements often include not only traditional banking
institutions, but also a range of nontraditional lenders, such as hedge funds, private equity
funds, insurance companies, pension funds and investment divisions of large corporations.
See, e.g., Mark Brannum, Hedge Funds Make for PainfulBankruptcies, 23 TEX. LAW. 21
(2007).
325 On the difficulty of obtaining consensus in lender groups, see Antje Brunner & Jan
Pieter Krahnen, Corporate Debt Restructuring: Evidence on Lending Coordination in
FinancialDistress 18-21 (Centre for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3030,
2001).
326 Economist Ronald Coase's theorem describes the relationship between economic
efficiency of a resource allocation and externalities. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 5-6 (1960). According to the theorem, in the absence of
transaction costs, the initial allocation of property rights is not determinative, as parties will
naturally tend to bargain with respect to resource allocation and externalities. See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 293, 33032 (1992) (describing Coasian theory in legal analyses).
327 This argument is skillfully made in Russell S. Sobel & Randall G. Holcombe, The
Unanimous Voting Rule Is Not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange, 106 PUB.
324

CHOICE 233, 233 (2001).
328 See Highland Crusader Offshore Partners LP v. LifeCare Holdings Inc., 377
F.App'x 422 (5th Cir. 2010) (involving a borrower who offered to pay an increased
amendment fee to certain holdout lenders in exchange for consent to a loan modification).
329 Game theoretic models are explored in the sovereign bond context in Kenneth M.
Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis
Intervention 3-5 (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/134, 2003).
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The court would likely find that a supermajority consent mechanism is more
apt to achieve the greatest overall net utility maximization. The court would then
proceed to test the economic effect of the allocation. Here, the allocation pertains
to legal rights and remedies of a zero-sum nature. However, in disputes that
involve contractual surplus, the surplus would be allocated in accordance with, and
in proportion to, the actual economic interests of the parties in the financing
arrangement. 330 As a final step, the court might test the. reasonableness of any
outcome by comparing the end result to what would occur in the absence of
judicial intervention. Essentially, this final step assures that the court's intervention
does not substantially deviate from the course that is most likely to be taken in the
absence of judicial involvement. It merely removes the rent-seeking, contractual
arbitrage and other inefficiencies that derive from the disparity between presentday economic realities and strict contractual rights.
Beyond the facts of Beal, a more expansive decisional paradigm would have
great utility across a range of disputes that are presently decided under strict,
Imperative-driven methodologies. For instance, similar disputes arise when a
borrower has defaulted on a debt obligation and might avoid bankruptcy if an
accommodation can be obtained from lenders. 3 3 1 Indeed, this was precisely the
situation in the failed Chrysler debt restructuring negotiations,332 in which the
company needed unanimous consent of its lenders to a $2 billion cash settlement in
s.atisfaction of approximately $6.9 billion of indebtedness.333 The four largest
lenders in the financing arrangement, holding approximately seventy percent of the
outstanding indebtedness, agreed to the workout terms,33 4 but the remaining
lenders refused and the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 33 5
330 Any remaining surplus might be allocated to parties that did not make an economic
investment in, and were not party to, the financing arrangement-but have suffered the
greatest actual or prospective losses as a result of the deterioration in the financing
arrangement. These parties might include other investors, including secured or unsecured
debt holders and equity shareholders, as well as customers, pensioners, employees,
suppliers, and even more remote parties, such as current or prospective tort claimants. The
consequences of defaults and bankruptcies on such parties are explored in the factually
outdated but conceptually relevant article, David Welch et al., What If GM Did Go
Bankru t . .. , BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 12, 2005.
33 Headlines of loan workouts hint at the frequency of protracted negotiations
between borrowers and lender groups. See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Houghton Owner
Restructures Debt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2010; General Growth forbearance request
deadlinepasses, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009.
332 See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
133 Bill Vlasic, Holdouts Jeopardize Debt Planfor Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2009, at B4.

334
3

See id.
Shefali Anand, The Chrysler Bankruptcy Plan: Oppenheimer Fund Refused to

Budge, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2009, at A2. Admonishing the lenders who declined to
consent, President Obama stated, "I don't stand with those who held out when everyone
else is making sacrifices." Id.
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In cases of this sort, borrowers sometimes proceed to Chapter 11 bankruptcy
in an effort to obtain a so-called cram down, whereby the bankruptcy court
imposes a restructuring plan over the objections of minority lenders if certain
requirements are met.3 36 Substantial utility maximization might be reached if, in
lieu of a bankruptcy filing, a court could reduce a unanimous consent
mechanism 3 37 to that of a supermajority or simple majority consent mechanism, or
reduce a supermajority consent mechanism3 3 8 to that of a simple majority. These
outcomes would in many cases yield considerable utility-maximization, and
simply replicate the consent mechanism that is likely to be imposed on the lenders
if the borrower seeks bankruptcy protection.33 9
Even beyond lender consent thresholds, a more expansive analysis would
enable courts to more effectively resolve a great number of disputes in the
corporate financing realm. For instance, this approach would be instrumental in
cases where a borrower is in covenant default rather than monetary default, and the
covenants impose obligations that are alleged to be unreasonable or excessively
burdensome. 3 40 Other potential applications include defaults declared under
material adverse change or lender insecurity clauses, and cases arising due to a
lender341 or co-venturer342 refusing to fund advances.
Under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may under certain
circumstances "cram down" a plan notwithstanding rejection by a creditor class. For a
thorough discussion of consent mechanisms in the bankruptcy context, see Bussel & Klee,
supra note 256.
337 Unanimous consent mechanisms substantially limit restructuring options. For
example, a British chemicals company required the unanimous consent of its lenders, and
thus a restructuring proposal that garnered the approval of 81% of senior lenders and 90%
ofjunior creditors could not proceed without litigation. Tom Freke, Lenders Poised to Take
British Vita Stake-Sources, REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2009.
338 Such a mechanism might have been useful in the situation of retail mall owner
General Growth Properties Inc. One major news outlet announced that the company was
"struggling to avoid filing for bankruptcy protection," as "a plan to defray payment on five
series of bonds failed to secure sufficient bondholder support, sending its stock down as
much as 10%." Ilaina Jonas, General Growth Fails to Win Bondholder Support, REUTERS,
Mar. 30, 2009. The company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection the following
month. See Ilaina Jonas, General Growth Bankruptcy Faces Challenge, REUTERS, June 9,
2009.
339 See supranote 333 and accompanying text.
340 These so-called "technical defaults" are more likely to occur when industry
downturns make it difficult for corporate borrowers to comply with financial covenants.
See David Hahn, The Roles of Acceleration, 8 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 229, 232-35
(2010).
341 "Failure to fund" cases demonstrate the importance of considering
present-day
economic circumstances, since in many cases it might be economically inefficient to
compel lenders to continue to gain risk exposure. In cases of this sort, courts continue to
construe the underlying loan documents, drawing upon procedural remedies to compel
results dictated by the language. See Destiny USA Holdings, LLC v. Citigroup Global
336
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Outside of the lending realm, this decisional paradigm would have great
utility in circumstances where financing arrangements are profoundly
interconnected. For instance, at the time of the Lehman Brothers' Chapter 11
filing, the Lehman corporate family was party to more than ten thousand derivative
contracts, with more than 1.7 million transactions outstanding. 3 43 In each case, the
underlying contract contained language granting priority of payment in the event
of a default, including the filing of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.344 To the extent
financing transactions are interconnected, the consequences of default are only
further magnified,34 5 and substantial instability and uncertainty can arise when
outcomes allocate rights, remedies and surplus in a manner that fails to comport
with economic substance.
Moreover, where economic instability emerges from within markets, the
judiciary can serve as an important first-line of defense against further market
disruptions by providing flexible and responsive redress as arrangements begin to
unravel. Courts that look solely to underlying agreements pursuant to strict,
Imperative-driven methodologies miss an opportunity to contribute meaningful
reforms to the law governing financial transactions. And, ironically, this restrictive
approach does little to preserve market stability.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it has evolved across decades of case law and legislative enactments, the
Certainty Imperative has profoundly altered judicial decision-making in finance
and lending by encouraging strict interpretive norms and rejecting more expansive
contextual analyses. Over time, the Imperative's methodological constraints have
become a paralyzing force upon the judiciary, preventing it from engaging in legal
reform. In essence, the law of corporate finance places the highest value upon the
status quo. The methodological constraints imposed by the Imperative must be
overcome. As modern corporate financing arrangements grow more complex,
moral hazards arise when contractual language vests substantive rights and
Mkts. Realty Corp., 889 N.Y.S.2d 793, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (granting a preliminary
injunction and ordering a commercial lender to fund advances to enable a borrower to
complete construction).
342 A case of this sort is pending in New York. An investment management company
sued its joint venture partner, asserting that the latter failed to fund its commitments. See
Sasha M. Pardy, Coventry Files $500M Lawsuit Against Developers Diversified, COSTAR
GRP., Nov. 5,2009.
343

Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd., 422 B.R. 407,

412 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). A United States Bankruptcy Court and an English court
construed the underlying swap agreements against principles of each nation's bankruptcy
laws, reaching opposite results. Joseph Checkler, Lehman Ends Suit with BNY Mellon,
PerpetualTrustee, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010.
344 See supra note 343.
345 See supra note 330.

HeinOnline -- 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1526 2011

2011]

CONFRONTING THE CERTAINTY IMPERATIVE

1527

remedies in a manner that does not align with evolving economic interests. Courts
must be empowered to apply more expansive analyses designed to allocate legal
rights and remedies in a manner that is consistent with the actual economic
arrangement of the parties.
Some will disagree with my appraisal. Criticisms of more expansive judicial
analyses have been articulated in the related areas of corporate and transactional
law. 34 6 The realm of corporate finance is not beyond the reach of similar
arguments, as each substantive area of the law represents yet another showcase for
longstanding tensions between legal formalism and realism, 34 7 and between textual
and contextual approaches. The relatively uncharted realm of corporate finance
remains fertile ground for these and countless other philosophical tensions. More
interdisciplinary scholarly attention is needed in this area, particularly with respect
to the relationship between market stability and the underlying normative value of
legal certainty, the role of courts in financial markets, and the broader
interconnections among legal reform, systemic risk, and market efficiency.
However, an undeniable certainty emerges: to the extent this realm is subjected to
further analyses, we can expect lively and theoretically compelling discourse in the
law of corporate finance.

Compare Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure
of CorporateLaw, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005) (asserting that Delaware corporate
law is a "classical or 19th century common law model of lawmaking" with "some intrinsic
limitations, including that legal change is slow, standard-based, and incremental"), and
Jonathan R. Macey, Delaware: Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33
HOFSTRA L. REv. 1131, 1132-37 (2005) (claiming that because Delaware law is stable and
predictable, powerful interest groups enjoy a dominant position within the culture), and
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987) (claiming that judge-made law that is
favorable to corporations encourages corporations to litigate in Delaware, which in turn
increases litigation in the state), with Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 511 (2009) (characterizing Delaware corporate
law as "indeterminate" due to its abundance of judicial opinions and heavy reliance on
judicial fact-finding and vague standards), and Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price
Discriminationin the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1235-36
(2001) (arguing that "predictability is wanting" in Delaware due to its excessively intensive
litigation culture). See also Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of
Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1911 (1998) (arguing that
Delaware elicits litigation and grants broader judicial discretion, which gives Delaware a
competitive advantage over other states in the area of corporate law).
347 On the principal debates among legal scholars, see, for example, David Chamy,
The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 842 (1999); DeLong, supra note 47;
Robert A. Hillman, The "New Conservatism" in Contract Law and the Process of Legal
Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879 (1999).
346
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